

JPRS-USS-90-002  
9 MARCH 1990



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## **Soviet Union**

### ***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 5, September-October 1989

**[DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3]**

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19980122 179

# Soviet Union

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[Translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 5, Sep-Oct 1989

[The following is a translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* published in Moscow by the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated]

### INTERETHNIC RELATIONS

#### Stereotypes of Historical Self-Consciousness

905D0006A Moscow *SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA* in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed to press 25 Oct 89) pp 3-12

[Article by Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Ovsyannikov, candidate of economic sciences and chief sociologist of the USSR State Committee for Public Education. Author of the monograph "Topologiya potrebitelskogo povedeniya" [Typology of Consumer Behavior] (1989, as co-author). Our journal has published his articles: "Differentiation of Consumer Behavior" (No 3, 1982), "The Relationship of Labor and Consumption: Experience of Typological Analysis" (No 1, 1984), "Rationalization of Consumption: A Typological Approach" (No 4, 1987). Lidiya Georgiyevna Novikova and David Genrikhovich Rotman are employed in the special-problem scientific research laboratory for sociological research at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin. L.G. Novikova is a candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate. Our journal has published her article "The Youth Subculture: Standards and System of Values" (No 4, 1989, as co-author). D.G. Rotman is a candidate of philosophical sciences and leading science associate. This is the first time he appears in our journal. The article has been written from materials of interregional research]

[Text] There has been a sharp shift in the nationality awareness of the peoples in our country. The thesis which has been cultivated for many years by official propaganda on the lack of problems in interethnic relations has failed and the dissatisfaction and mutual insults which have built up over the decades have burst forth. Neighbors who until recently considered themselves good ones have become an object of criticism and at times very strong. From a Philistine seeking out of shortcomings among the representatives of other nations things have moved quickly to a reciprocal close reckoning of injustices and oppressions caused. And each side justifies its rights and complaints, as a rule, by referring to history. In a word, deep strata of the self-awareness of ethnoses more and more have been brought into the orbit of interethnic relations.

The authors in no way claim to judge the merits or drawbacks of the self-awareness of one or another people or all the more assess the validity of the ideas or proposed demands. Our aim has been something else

and that is an attempt using the materials of empirical research to bring out the structure and content of national historical awareness of students who are representatives of different nationalities.

In November 1988, within the All-Union Comprehensive Program of the Gosobrazovaniye [State Committee for Public Education] SSSR, "Public Opinion" research was conducted in the course of which we brought out the judgments by students of interethnic relations in the USSR and set out optimum models for the development of the different nations. Participating in the research were sociologists from several-score national VUZes. Some 4,133 students were questioned in 13 Union (except for Azerbaijan and Georgia) and 8 autonomous republics as well as in Moscow and Leningrad. The designated Union republics had been excluded from the sampling due to circumstances which did not depend upon the organizers of the research while the autonomous representatives of the Russian Federation were determined by the method of random nonrepeating sampling within the previously established geographic regions of the nation. In each republic from 140 to 250 students were questioned and here in the course of forming the selective aggregate, the nationality structure of the population was considered. The assembled data was processed on a computer using a packet of SAS programs.

#### Conflicts Real and Imaginary

Does the problem of interethnic relations exist in the Union republics? Here is what the students think about this: 32 percent asserts "yes, it does and it is acute"; 42 percent feel "yes, it does exist but it cannot be said that it is among the main ones"; 12 percent feel "no, it does not exist" and 14 replied "difficult to answer."

The most acute situation, in the opinion of the respondents, has arisen in Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Moldavia (Table 1). There is a high percentage of tension also in Armenia. However, here this is caused not by the state of affairs within the territory per se (in the republic, in contrast to the remainder, the share of nonindigenous nationalities is low), but rather to the conflict with geographic neighbors, the Azeris. As for the other republics, the views given by the representatives of different nations residing there are far from uniform. Thus, in Moldavia and Kazakhstan, the Moldavians and Kazakhs, respectively, are most concerned by the acuteness of interethnic problems, while in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan it is students of different nationalities (with the exception of the indigenous and the Russians). Discrepancies were not observed in the answers depending upon nationality among respondents from Estonia and Latvia. We feel that such a "breakdown" is not accidental. The ascertained picture reflects not groundless fears over the question of a noticed (and in some places existing) infringement of interests for persons of one or another nationality. Almost 1/2 of all those questioned (49 percent) pointed out that they had encountered a hostile attitude over the nationality question in various living situations: in admission to a VUZ (7 percent); in state institutions (12 percent); in the process of

study on the part of instructors and fellow students (14 percent); and, finally, most often in public places (46 percent).

**Table 1:**  
**Assessment of Acuteness of Interethnic Situation**  
**in Union Republics, Contrast Index\***

Republics	Nationality			Total
	Indigenous	Russian	Other	
RSFSR	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.01
Ukraine	0.01	-0.05	0.20	0.0
Belorussia	-0.08	-0.11	0.09	-0.06
Uzbekistan	0.15	0.26	0.29	0.27
Kazakhstan	0.55	0.37	0.37	0.36
Lithuania	0.53	0.76	0.75	0.63
Moldavia	0.62	0.39	0.56	0.58
Latvia	0.91	0.88	—	0.90
Kirghizia	0.12	0.23	0.18	0.16
Tajikistan	0.04	0.31	0.11	0.10
Armenia**	0.62	—	—	0.62
Turkmenia	-0.37	0.04	-0.05	-0.29
Estonia	0.80	0.76	0.66	0.76

\* The index is calculated by establishing the difference in the indicators for the maximally confirming and maximally denying alternatives divided by 100 %. The values of the index are ranked in an interval between +1 and -1; "+1" means the assessment of the problem of interethnic relations is very acute and "-1" is the complete denying of the presence of the given problem.

\*\* In the sampling aggregate for Armenia, basically students were included of Armenian nationality (98 %) and this corresponds to the structure of the republic's population.

Precisely those who personally had felt the hostility of persons around merely because they were of a different nationality felt that the problem of interethnic relations was very acute in the given republics. Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation which was very high (0.9413) indicates the presence of a direct and close link between the variables "Assessment of Interethnic Situation in Republic" and "Instances of Hostile Attitude Toward Representatives of Different Nationalities."

It is worthy of note that the respondents happened to encounter a hostile attitude on a nationality basis most often in public places such as on the streets, in transport, stores, at the market and so forth. Clearly here the phenomenon of mass awareness has been activated, when irritation built up in store lines and bus stops is unleashed primarily against "foreigners." (In this same group are put the "migrants," "village clods," "parasitic intellectuals" and so forth, depending upon the situation.) In essence, in a predominant majority of such instances, one can speak not about manifestations of nationalism but sooner about the result of the constant action of stress factors (as a consequence of the total scarcity and everyday disorder) and which are "super-imposed" on the absence of an elementary level of intercourse.

Joint activities (studies, employment) sharply reduce the interethnic hostility. According to our data, its extreme degree (toward all nationalities with the exception of oneself) was discovered only in 0.9 percent of all those questioned, around 25 percent supported, if it can be so put, internationalism "with conditions" (good relations toward a majority and bad to some), while over 70 percent of the students who participated in the questioning did not link their attitude toward others with their nationality. Consequently, as a whole, interpersonal relations among students cannot become grounds for the negative assessments of the interethnic situation. There are other, more profound causes of the tension and these are rooted both in the political-economic as well as the linguistic-cultural and historical areas.

As is known, a majority of the Union republics is multinational and in certain of them representatives of the nonindigenous nationality comprise almost 1/2 of the population. In their dealings with others, they speak, as a rule, in Russian. The indigenous inhabitants also used it (in any event until recently) in contacts with persons of other nationalities, thereby recognizing Russian as the means of interethnic communication. As for the Russian-speaking groups of the population, they had a poor mastery of the language of the indigenous nationality (see Table 1). Such a situation, naturally, caused a negative reaction among the indigenous inhabitants of the Union republics. The reticence to study the language of the indigenous nationality was identified (quite validly) with disrespect toward this nationality, as without a knowledge of the people's language it is impossible to understand its culture and comprehend traditions and customs. This was one of the important circumstances complicating the interethnic situation in many of the nation's republics.

**Table 2:**  
**Share of Respondents of Nonindigenous Nationality**  
**Mastering Language of Indigenous Nationality, %**

Republics*	Nationalities	
	Russian	Other
Ukraine	45	40
Belorussia	12	16
Uzbekistan	3	37
Kazakhstan	8	11
Lithuania	27	29
Moldavia	4	28
Latvia	14	0
Kirghizia	18	11
Tajikistan	3	24
Turkmenia	0	29
Estonia	10	3

\* Armenia is not included in the list due to the reason indicated in the note to Table 1.

Among the measures initiated at present to rectify the existing situation, we must mention first of all the introduction of instruction in the languages of the indigenous nationalities in the Russian schools. As is known, a number of republics has adopted language laws in accord with which official business should be conducted in the language of the indigenous population, newspapers and magazines should be published and radio and TV broadcasts transmitted. However, often the adopting of such laws, particularly when this has been accompanied by the demands of immediate execution, has caused dissatisfaction among the Russian-speaking inhabitants who feel that this violates their civil rights. Thus, 92 percent of the respondents who were Russians and representatives of other nationalities were against having instruction in the VUZes solely in the language of the indigenous nationality. The opposing viewpoint was shared by 85 percent of the Latvian students, 82 percent of the Lithuanians, 63 percent of the Estonians and 40 percent of the Moldavians. One must point out that along with the requests voiced to representatives of other nationalities to study the language of the indigenous population, the research also recorded proposals such as "let them study where they teach their language" (10 percent).

The development of real bilingualism should be provided not only by legal enactments. Here also of great importance is the material aspect (the publishing of special teaching aids, dictionaries, the training of teachers and so forth) and what is probably the most important thing, a broad general cultural base.

### Unlearned Lessons of History

Considering the irrefutable fact that the desire and ability to perceive a different national culture depend upon the depth, completeness and "stereoscopicity" of the vision of oneself, we have endeavored to ascertain the formative elements in national historical self-awareness of the students: a) notions of events which played the most important role in the fates of their nation (both positive and negative); b) assessments of the postrevolutionary history of their republic and the entire nation; c) attitude toward different models of future development of our society.

The first element was established by an open question. An analysis of the answers to it made it possible to establish several substantive blocks which comprise the national historical stereotypes of awareness. Such a cliched approach with "ready-made" blocks is completely understandable as the enthusiasm of the complete break with the past so characteristic of the revolutionary perception of the world in the 1920s and later reinforced in the Stalinist ideology and practice of barracks socialism led to the violent separating of several generations of Soviet people from their national and cultural-historical roots. About 1/3 of the students questioned by us living in Union and autonomous republics could not mention any historical events which had been significant for their peoples. In the awareness of the others the "count" of national history in a majority of instances began with the Great October Revolution. As a result, the most widespread national-historical stereotype of events which played an affirmative role, in addition to the revolution, was represented by the victory in the Great Patriotic War and by the entire range of changes in the social life of the nation and linked to perestroika. The analogous stereotype of negative events includes Stalinism (40 percent), the Great Patriotic War (14 percent) and the period of stagnation (18 percent). In both instances it is a question of events which do not have a specific national character (what has been said does not apply to the Baltic region).

Regardless of such clearly expressed uniformity of historical awareness, in the perception of certain of the listed factors by the Russians and the representatives of other nationalities, there are major differences (see Table 3). While over 50 percent of the former [Russians], consider the Great October Revolution as a most important factor of national history (it is a different question of how they variously perceive its influence on the destiny of the Russian nation with 47 percent affirmatively and 5 percent negatively), in the second group no one gives the revolution a negative assessment but only a few call it an important positive fact in history. In other words, it has not become established in the awareness of these students as an event of their national past.

**Table 3:**  
**Assessment of Certain Events in History by Students of Russian and Other Nationalities, %**

Events	Russian		Representatives of Other Nationalities	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Great October Revolution	47	5	23	—
Great Patriotic War	—	15	—	13
Victory in Great Patriotic War	17	—	4	—
Perestroika	30	—	12	—

Very interesting is the difference in the perception of the Great Patriotic War and the victory won in it. Among the Russian students, approximately an equal number consider the war itself as among the main negative ones while the victory in it as positive points in Russian history; in the awareness of representatives of the other

nationalities the victorious result was somewhat different as this event was not linked to national history.

Students from the indigenous nationalities of the Baltic and Moldavia—regions which later than the others were incorporated in the USSR—do not perceive the October

Revolution as a positive historical event which had a substantial effect on the fate of the nation. Only 4 percent consider it thus. Of the Russian students living in these republics, a similar view was given by 39 percent. In the regions of traditional Slavic settlement (Russia, including Moscow and Leningrad, the Ukraine and Belorussia) the analogous indicators are already 46 percent among the Russians and 35 percent among representatives of other peoples; in the Central Asian republics, respectively, 52 percent (for the Russians) and 32 percent (indigenous nationalities).

Of the specifically national historical events, the representatives of the indigenous nationalities point out as a positive one the annexation of the given region to Russia (as a whole 11 percent). This element is encountered most often in the national historical stereotype of the Ukrainian (30 percent) and the Kazakhs (27 percent). Moreover, the Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians have a positive perception of the annexation of the western and eastern oblasts of their national territories. Among the Moldavians, this element holds first place in their awareness, and among the Belorussians and Ukrainians, second and third.

As for the students of the Baltic republics, they mention the establishing of an independent bourgeois republic as a positive factor (93 percent of the Estonians, 53 percent of the Lithuanians and 24 percent of the Latvians) and a negative factor is the "introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of the republic after the concluding of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the annexation by the USSR in 1940" (76 percent of the Estonians, 75 percent of the Lithuanians and 34 percent of the Latvians).

It is very noteworthy that the establishing of an Union republic on national territory as a most important historical fact was noted only by the students in Belorussia with both Belorussians (12 percent) and Russians (24 percent). Most probably this outburst of "historical enthusiasm" is explained by the fact that the questionnaire was conducted here during the days of celebrating the 70th anniversary of the formation of Belorussia. And the celebrations devoted to the 1,000th anniversary of the Christianizing of Russia clearly played a role in the fact that the acceptance of Christianity was mentioned as a most important historical event in national history by 11 percent of the Muscovites and Leningraders. The remaining Slavs living far away from the traditional centers of the Orthodox faith overlooked this fact. The positive stereotype in a portion of the Russian students includes a notion of the reforms of Peter I (12 percent), while 2 or 3 percent mentioned in addition to this the "liberation from the Tatar-Mongol yoke," the "Battle of Kulikovo," "the abolishing of serfdom" and "the 20th CPSU Congress." One should note that among a majority of the questioned students from the Central Asian region, a feeling of national historical identity had been lost—in any event on the verbal level—and this was both among representatives of the indigenous peoples as well as among Russians. Both these groups limit themselves to mentioning the revolution, the establishing of

Soviet power and perestroika as among the historical events of their national history.

As the research showed, a portion of the indigenous population wrongly identifies the chauvinistic policy of Stalin with the Russian people as a whole. Hence, the excessively emotional elimination of certain historical values.

A different situation has arisen in the autonomous republics. The permanent positive national historical stereotypes among the representatives of all the minority peoples include four elements: the Great October Revolution (45 percent), annexation by Russia (20 percent), the founding of the autonomous republic and its incorporation within the USSR (8 percent) and perestroika (11 percent). Here the given events are completely absent in the negative stereotype, that is, in other words, the entire complex of historical facts related to the "connecting" of the minority peoples to Russian history and culture is basically viewed affirmatively. The negative stereotype includes such elements as Stalinism (26 percent), the Great Patriotic War (15 percent) and the era of stagnation (16 percent). Of the specifically national events, the revolt of Salavat Yulayev is seen on the positive level in Bashkiria (19 percent) and the 1981 strike is seen on the negative level in Northern Osipia (18 percent). In other words, national historical awareness among the minority peoples has become rather consolidated (but not on its own national basis) and is marked by a small range of components.

To the question of from what sources the students gain information on those historical events which comprise the basis of their national historical awareness, as was expected, in first place were the mass information media (58 percent) followed by fiction (38 percent). Then comes the direct environment of the students: the teacher (36 percent), parents and relatives (28 percent), friends (18 percent) and informal associations (5 percent).

The notions concerning the content and values of one's national history are most closely correlated with an assessment of its chronologically closest and most pertinent period, the postrevolutionary. This component of historical awareness is ascertained from two criteria: a) the assessment of the past within the range from the complete condemnation of the postrevolutionary period as a complete chain of mistakes and crimes up to its complete approbation as corresponding to the normative model of "authentic" socialism; b) the measure ensuing from this of historical optimism in relation to current events ("there is a way out" or "there is no way out"). Let us see what views the students hold on the postrevolutionary past of the nation.

A total of five positions was established. 1. A recognition of the presence of major errors in Soviet history. Some of them, as the supporters of this position feel, were inevitable but precisely which ones is a question of historical chance and today's perestroika can help rectify them.

This was the opinion of 25 percent of those questioned. 2. Support for the Stalinist model of socialism and the rejection of those changes which have occurred in recent years (2 percent). 3. The "optimistic" position. This is shared by those who, while recognizing the incorrectness of the past path, see in perestroika a real historical chance to escape from the stagnation and create a modern, dynamically developing society (45 percent). 4. Profoundly pessimistic. This was supported by about 19 percent of the respondents who had an excessively gloomy view of both our past and our future. The last, fifth group, included those who still had not determined their positions.

Clearly, a concrete assessment of the nation's postrevolutionary past depends primarily upon the degree of the conformity of the real history of the USSR to those notions of the normative model of socialism which have arisen in the minds of the respondents. Judging from the obtained data, the ideas of barracks socialism among the students are extremely unpopular. However, it is possible, we feel, to speak about the illusory nature of the historical awareness of those 25 percent of the students who viewed the Stalinist repressions, the subsequent political and economic voluntarism and so forth as historical chance. The harsh consequence of the discrepancy between the theory of socialism and its actual embodiment is also the fact that virtually 1/5 of the respondents sees the situation in which the nation currently finds itself as a blind alley and can imagine no escape from it.

#### Recollections of the Future

Since the notion of the desired future of our nation (primarily sociopolitical) is formed on the basis of one or another historical stereotype of conscience, we proposed that the respondents reply proceeding from what principles, in their view, national construction should be carried out in the USSR. Here five positions were also established. The supporters of the first of them, or the "conservatives," felt that the development and the interaction of the Soviet republics should be carried out on the former principles (4.7 percent). The second viewpoint of "pseudointernational" brought together those

who would see the USSR as a nation without national differences and republic frontiers (18 percent). Over 1/2 of those questioned (55 percent) comprised supporters of the constructive position: "My republic should have real economic and political independence within the USSR." The fourth group included those who shared separatist views and were certain that their republic would develop more successfully if it withdrew from the USSR (7 percent). Some 10 percent of those questioned did not have their own opinion on this question.

There is the noteworthy fact that either program for the future development of the nation had very little linkage to real knowledge of the historical past of one's people as only 20 percent of the students considered their knowledge sufficient, 70 percent recognized insufficient awareness and 8.3 percent self-critically admitted that they did not have any knowledge of the history of their people. It should be pointed out that the percentage of "experts" among those who argued for the withdrawal of their republic from the USSR was somewhat higher than as an average for the sampling with 33 percent. We only do not know what the supporters of extreme solutions have in mind: the history of the relationships of the Stalinist administration with Soviet peoples or the history of the relationships of these peoples themselves.

Now, let us examine how the views of the past are related to one or another position on the question of the future development of the republics (Table 4). As we can see, the reducing of the crimes of the past to a chain of tragic accidents is most often characteristic of persons who have not determined their attitude toward the future, who are afraid of changes as well as those who propose moving further along the path of the complete assimilation of nations. The first two of the listed groups most expresses the "Stalinist" position. The least inclined to justify the past are the supporters of the development of their republic outside the USSR and they are also the most pessimistic in terms of the past. The difference in the quantitative expression is so great that the conclusion emerges that precisely the excess of negative emotions in assessing the past and not history itself fosters and extremism of this group of students.

**Table 4:**  
**Relationship of Preferred Model for Development of National Republics With Assessment of Postrevolutionary History of USSR**

Model of Future Development	View of Previous Development of Nation, %				
	Uncritically Justifying	"Stalinist"	Optimistic	Pessimistic	No Opinion
USSR should develop along previous path	35	4	47	7	2
USSR should become a nation without national differences	30	2	51	11	3
Republics should be granted economic and political independence	24	1	48	20	4
Republic could develop outside USSR	10	1	19	59	6
No definite opinion	31	3	41	9	13



The typology of the carriers of national historical awareness is based upon two criteria: a) the number of representatives of the nation capable of stating the most essential events of their history; b) the number of events actually stated. From this viewpoint, it is possible to establish the following types. I. "Unconsolidated" mass awareness when the students give a large number of events with 1 or 2 percent of those replying for each of these events (for instance, in the RSFSR, 85 percent of the students mentioned over 40 important facts of Russian history). II. Mass politicized awareness when a majority is also aware of the historical material but the range of events mentioned is limited. For example, a predominant number of replies by Estonian students focused on three or four events of the recent past or the present. III. "Consolidated" elite awareness when not all reply to the question but those who do answer have a good mastery of the material. Thus, in Armenia, 40 percent of the students were unable to mention any event from national history, while the remaining 60 percent did this in a very skilled manner. Finally, as for the fourth type one can speak only hypothetically, since here it would be generally difficult to speak of historical awareness as an integrated phenomenon. For example, 1/2 of the Uzbek students was unable to answer the corresponding question while the remainder reduced their history to the Great October Revolution and perestroika. Indicatively some 85 percent of them did not name a single negative fact.

As a whole in the national historical conscience of the student youth, there is a predominance of facts of military political history (battles, territorial partitions, political actions and so forth). The sociocultural component is very little expressed. Only among the Armenian students does the national historical stereotype include such events as the invention of the national alphabet (18 percent) and the adoption of Christianity (14 percent). Generally, it is possible to speak about the loss of a national historical authenticity among a significant portion of the student youth. Its national conscience devoid of its own cultural-historical grounds is incapable of the profound perception of other cultures.

The historical awareness of the respondents was also marked by a "dynastic" style of perceiving the past, when the criterion for dividing the historical process was the rule of specific individuals. (For example, the "Brezhnev era," or "the time of Khrushchev's leadership of the nation.") The characteristic features of this also are fragmentariness, limitedness (basically historically close events are mentioned), maximum politization and, as a consequence, the predominance of ideological cliches. The strong condemnation of Stalinism and the age of stagnation shows not a true historical awareness but only the substituting in it of certain ideological cliches for others. The illusory nature of this is maintained. Consequently, it is easy to manipulate this.

Let us examine the last thesis using such an example as the attitude of the students toward the problems of republic cost accounting and citizenship. Recently, these

terms have begun to be repeated more and more often on the pages of newspapers and magazines, in the TV and radio broadcasts as well as in the speeches of politicians and economists and the USSR people's deputies. Some link to these their hopes for a future flourishing of their nation; others, conversely, fear that the realization of the corresponding measures will lead to the breakdown of federative unity, to national exclusiveness and, as a consequence, to inevitable stagnation; still others try to assess soberly the available raw material and personnel resources needed for the radical changes. We asked the students to define their attitude toward the ideas of republic cost accounting and citizenship. Table 5 gives the distribution of positive replies ("I consider the introduction of republic cost accounting necessary" and "I look positively at the idea of introducing republic citizenship") by various nationality groups of respondents.

**Table 5:**  
**Share of Respondents Approving Idea of Republic**  
**Citizenship and Republic Cost Accounting, %**

Republics	Nationality	Republic Citizenship	Republic Cost Accounting
Ukraine	Russians	10	48
	Ukrainians	25	68
Belorussia	Russians	12	63
	Belorussians	19	60
Uzbekistan	Russians	31	29
	Uzbeks	28	30
Kazakhstan	Russians	3	61
	Kazakhs	39	53
Lithuania	Russians	9	50
	Lithuanians	84	93
Moldavia	Russians	—	39
	Moldavians	46	51
Latvia	Russians	14	35
	Latvians	91	86
Kirghizia	Russians	2	30
	Kirghiz	30	48
Tajikistan	Russians	8	39
	Tajiks	34	40
Turkmenistan	—	—	29
	Turkmen	9	48
Estonia	Russians	28	64
	Estonians	96	98

The Russian students were more cautious than the representatives of the indigenous nationalities in their attitude toward the idea of republic cost accounting (with the exception of the respondents from Kazakhstan and Central Asia) and they generally viewed the introduction of republic citizenship negatively. Clearly, here

not the last role is played by a fear that the carrying out of the designated ideas might lead to the development of separatism, to an infringing of the sovereign rights of the nonnative population in the Union republics and to the growth of anti-Russian attitudes. Just how valid are such fears? In the given research it was not possible to provide a uniform answer (such a task was not even set), however, certain comments by the respondents of the indigenous nationalities are alarming. Thus, respectively only 7 and 5 percent of those questioned felt that citizenship in a Union republic could be obtained by all those who desired this or by all who live in it. As a rule, the representatives of the indigenous nationalities put forward conditions and demands such as a knowledge of the language, the fact of birth in a given republic. In the opinion of 5 percent of the respondents, the sole condition for obtaining republic citizenship should be belonging to an indigenous nationality. With such a posing of the question, the idea of republic citizenship becomes one of the reasons for national confrontation and which in some places has already developed into direct clashes along nationality lines.

Judging from the obtained results, the progressive idea of republic cost accounting in a number of republics derives not from economic analysis but is founded on economic mythology. In some places this is used more often as a means of political agitation than as a method for resolving complex economic problems. A predominant majority of the students sees in cost accounting a panacea against many economic disasters and a means which would possess an immediate effect. Such a conviction is rather dangerous. In any event, rapid disappointment could lead to unpredictable severe consequences. A facile approach to reality is also apparent in the assessment of the reasons which may impede the development of cost accounting. Thus, the role of the raw material base is clearly underestimated (94 percent of the respondents do not see any problem in this), as well as factors as the one-sided development of the economy in a number of republics (95 percent), the absence of a sufficient number of professional personnel (95 percent) and so forth. Particularly characteristic is an excessively optimistic approach to the problems of republic cost accounting for students of the indigenous nationalities in the European Union republics.

Lastly, the heightening of interethnic tension in a number of the nation's regions requires a further deep study of the national historical roots of different cultures, the particular features of national character and the stereotypes of conduct, national-cultural motivation and so forth. Such research should have an interdisciplinary nature.

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## POLITICS. DEMOCRACY. THE INDIVIDUAL.

### Party Ideological Unity and Socialist Pluralism of Opinions

905D0006B Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 13-22

[Article by Petr Nikolayevich Fedoseyev, academician and advisor to the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences and author of the book "Kommunizm i filosofiya" [Communism and Philosophy] (1971), "Marksizm v XX veke" [Marxism in the 20th Century] (1972), "Dialektika sovremennoy epokhi" [Dialectics of the Modern Age] (1975), "Filosoviya i nauchnoye poznanie" [Philosophy and Scientific Cognition] (1983) and others. His articles have appeared repeatedly in our journal.]

[Text] Does the socialist pluralism of opinions exclude the ideological unity of the communists? Is a socialist pluralism of opinions feasible with a single party ideology? These questions have repeatedly arisen in the practice of internal party life and in the assessment of the ideological debates occurring in various forms and on different levels under the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of Soviet society. In the search for the truth, there has been increased interest in Lenin's theoretical heritage and the historical revolutionary experience of the party.

In founding the revolutionary party of the working class, Lenin gave fundamental significance to its ideological arming. He was convinced and constantly persuaded his associates that "the role of a progressive fighter can be carried out only by a party led by advanced theory" [1]. The fixed scientific foundation for the ideology of the Bolshevik party was Marxism as an integrated and unified system of views concerning the patterns, driving forces and prospects of social development.

The question of the difference and diversity of opinions and persuasions in the party ranks with the commonness of the Marxist ideology has been settled differently in the various historical stages. Differences of opinion and at times extremely acute disputes over ideological and political questions arose within the context and on the basis of the Marxist ideology in the party both before and after Great October. The debates became particularly intense when the social contradictions were exacerbated in society and the political situation became more complex. Here the basic ideological criteria for loyalty to the party always remained the recognition of Marxism and, respectively, its leadership in practical activities. A departure from the fundamentals of Marxist teachings in philosophy or sociology, in economic or historical science, and on the questions of strategy and tactics ultimately led to a temporary or complete departure from the party and to an organizational break with it.

The differences and clashes of opinions and judgments over various questions on a Marxist basis never undermined the party's ideological unity, since such a unity meant not a unification of views but rather the elaboration of common positions on the basis of a Marxist analysis with the different approaches to it. This ensured the dynamic ideological and sociopolitical life of the party.

In Lenin's times this was how they realized the dialectics of the party's ideological unity and the diversity of opinions and approaches to resolving new questions in theory and practice from the standpoint of scientific socialism.

Subsequently, with the introduction of the administrative-bureaucratic methods of leadership in the time of Stalinism, the Leninist understanding of party ideological unity as a synthesis of the collective creative thought was replaced by the principle of directive uniformity of thought which killed the creative development of theory and legitimized a thoughtless dogmatism. Any decision or instruction of the party leadership or from Stalin himself came to be considered the unchallenged truth which had merely to be affirmed and repeated. The slightest deviation from the directive text was declared to be an "error" or even a "distortion" of party theory and policy and correspondingly was punished by party and administrative procedures. One has merely to recall the series of decrees of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the speeches by the leaders on ideological questions, on philosophy and political economy, literature and art, beginning from the end of the 1920s and their pernicious effect on the spiritual life of society.

The Stalinist "monolithic unity" in the party resulted in the justifying of the suppression of internal party democracy, criticism and self-criticism and any possibility of a free exchange of opinions and a comparison of different approaches and the collective search for solving the questions of domestic and foreign policy. In such a situation of the proclaiming of the party's leading role served as a cover for autocratic dominance over all state affairs.

The "directive conformity of ideas" in the party depersonalized the communists, it implanted a "spiritual leveling," suppressed the development of individuality, excluded independent thinking and imposed from above pat replies and conclusions on all questions of theory and practice. A cult was made of the mechanical perceiving of ideological stereotypes like the prohibitions of the Scriptures. Of course, the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin were published, a course of Marxism-Leninism was taught in the VUZes, various circles for studying this were established, but here the Stalinist interpretation of theoretical questions was dominant. The theoretical dogmas were fitted to the existing command-bureaucratic practices and in turn were used to justify this practice as supposedly the expression and realization of the objective laws of social development operating independently of the conscience and will of people. For long years such dogmas were drummed into our

heads and we, the social scientists, in turn obfuscated the minds of other people and the conscience of new generations with these same dogmas. Theoretical work was divorced from the processes occurring in life and it came down to a repetition of rote provisions.

The international contacts of Soviet scientists were extremely restricted and the isolation of our social sciences from the world scientific community was intensified. Political confrontation on the state level was also reflected in the nature of scientific contacts which more and more were replaced by ideological opposition, and this constricted meaningful debate, scientific dialogue and the reciprocal exchange of scientific data and conclusions, new achievements and new problems. Attention to the history of domestic social thought was sharply weakened, a negative attitude took root toward the ideological and theoretical heritage of many prominent thinkers of different ideological schools and the professional level of social scientists declined.

The unmasking and condemnation of the repressive regime and theoretical dogmas of Stalin encouraged an activization of social thought and opened up opportunities for scientific discussion and for studying urgent problems of life. But even after this the chains of "administrative conformity of thought" impeded theoretical thinking, they reinforced dogmatism and orthodoxy, although many ringing phrases were voiced against them from the highest rostrums. And when at times there was a certain revival in some area of theory which went beyond the established stereotypes, there went into action a "guiding" pressure under the pretext of observing "ideological discipline."

Of course, there were groups of active scientists engaged with fundamental and pertinent problems which were also of great practical significance. Covertly and sometimes openly there were debates on the contradictions in the development of socialism and in particular on the contradictions between the productive forces and production relations, between the base and the superstructure, between objective opportunities and subjective factors and so forth. Various judgments and proposals were voiced on the possible paths and methods for overcoming the contradictions and difficulties which arose in society. However, the overall state of science was lethally affected by the indifference shown by the party leadership, the soviet and economic bodies toward scientific developments and recommendations with these being drowned in the bureaucratic quagmire.

But ultimately the dialectics of life and social thought were stronger than the administrative-bureaucratic machine. In spite of the "directive conformity of thought" and the complacent attitude of the official leadership, within the ranks of the party and among the leading cadres there was a growing alarm for the deteriorating state of affairs in the nation as well as a growing recognition of the need for fundamental changes in the economic and sociopolitical life of Soviet society and in international relations. In the process of the exchange of

opinion and contact with the party aktiv and on the basis of analyzing the problems which had built up and considering the pressing needs of the Soviet people and all the social and national communities, there arose and later were voiced more and more frankly at conferences and in the press the ideas which were to underlie the decisions of the April (1985) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th Party Congress. These ideas assumed their fullest and most definite expression in a number of speeches by M.S. Gorbachev and particularly in his report "The Living Creativity of the People" of 11 December 1984 at the All-Union Scientific-Tactical Conference on the Questions of Ideological Work. "In particular, it was stated: "It is essential to carry out profound changes in the economy and the entire system of social relations and provide a qualitatively higher standard of living for the Soviet people. As a result, socialism will rise to a new level of maturity" [6, pp 76-77].

The decisions of the April Central Committee Plenum and the 27th Party Congress opened up a new chapter in the life of the party and Soviet society and in the development of international relations. The party initiated enormous theoretical work in all areas for the revolutionary renovation of society, for the ideological support of perestroika and for the development of new political thinking.

The numerous publications, scientific conferences, symposiums and roundtables shook the stagnant calm in the sphere of ideology and caused an unprecedented ideological and political activeness in the people. Difficult and nontraditional questions were discussed from different viewpoints in economic and historical science, in philosophy and sociology, in literature and literary criticism. All these differences merged into ardent disputes and debates in the public, often they were greatly exacerbated by the mass information media, particularly in the polemics and exchanges between the individual journals.

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies which became a major event in the political history of our nation and even on a world scale offered an instructive example of a constructive debate and revealed the diversity of interests and opinions among the Soviet people, the presence of different judgments concerning the course of perestroika and the renewal of socialist society, as well as different approaches to resolving the very complex economic, social and nationality problems which had built up. But this did not prevent the congress from adopting fundamentally important decisions on the questions of domestic and foreign policy as well as organize the superior state bodies. Socialist pluralism of opinions withstood a strict sociopolitical test which showed that it does not contradict but rather assists in the consolidation and ensuring of true unity among the Soviet people.

At the congress there were individual speeches concerning attacks on the communist party, on its vanguard

role in Soviet society and attempts to place it in opposition to the soviets and democracy. But a predominant majority of the congress delegates rejected such unfounded attacks, recognizing that precisely now the party, as during the time of Lenin, had raised high the banner of democracy and its bodies, the Soviets.

The pertinent and at times very critical comments voiced at the congress concerning the practical activities of the party and its organizations, the slowness and inconsistency in carrying out the designated programs and unfulfilled promises did not shake the confidence in the party on the part of the broad masses of people and were received with proper attention, as an imperative to be followed in further work.

The main lesson was that the pluralism of opinions did not develop into infinite debates, disputes and squabbling among different-minded persons to the detriment of the common cause. The comparing and colliding of opinions over one of another urgent question should be accompanied by action, that is, by the taking of a balanced and sound decision and its active fulfillment. Otherwise, perestroika can suffer from noisy but sterile debates.

Naturally, the question arises of how a pluralism of opinions and currents is to be correlated to the principle of party ideological unity and does this require a single ideology at the present stage of social development.

Having headed revolutionary perestroika, the Communist Party in fact acts as the leading ideological-political and organizing force of all the Soviet people, it embodies their fundamental interests and goals, their will for the unceasing renovation of all forms of social life. In this Soviet society differs fundamentally from all previous and currently existing societies with antagonistic classes and class contradictions.

At the same time, the Soviet people are not a homogeneous community but is characterized by a diversity of social, nationality, demographic, professional and other groups, by a multiplicity of social organizations and associations which have the right to their own specific interests along with the general ones common to all the people. And naturally in social conscience a diversity of opinions, ideas and convictions is apparent.

It is worth recalling that in a number of socialist countries, a multiparty system has survived under analogous conditions and other parties exist along with the leading Marxist-Leninist party and they express the interests of definite strata of the population and as a whole support the policy of building socialism. Historical experience teaches that in various countries, in accord with their particular features and the level of social development, these questions may be resolved differently and there is no pat answer to them. In this regard, a concrete historical approach is particularly essential considering the social structure and political organization of society and the role of the Marxist-Leninist party in it.

In principle, Lenin considered possible collaboration with other parties in a socialist revolution and actually endeavored to involve all the leftist forces in building a new society in the interests of the people. In forming the first Soviet government, the Bolsheviks proposed that it include representatives from the leftist SR party. A government bloc was formed with Bolsheviks and the leftist SR party. But it was not due to the fault of the Bolsheviks and in fact contrary to their desire, this bloc split and was dissolved when the leftist SRs set out on a path of organizing insurrections against Soviet power. Thus, historically, a single-party system came into being in Soviet society, and headed by the communist party based on principles of Marxism-Leninism. Being in its historical origin and its class nature, the party of the working class, the CPSU in the course of socialist construction and in integrating the interests of all the strata of workers became the political vanguard of all the Soviet people.

The attempts to establish the need to create other political parties in our nation at present or in the future are clearly unjustified and simply groundless. From the theoretical viewpoint they are somewhat harebrained and in political terms are aimed at putting the CPSU and the Soviet people into opposition and isolating certain social groups from others and would end up not with the strengthening of their political unity but rather by separation. For example, this is the view of S. Andreyev in his article "The Structure of Power and the Tasks of Society" published in the journal NEVA. The author resolves the social questions of historical significance with an unusual simplicity and an uncommon agility of thought. From the very first page of the article, the author amazes one with his iron logic. "If it is considered that perestroika is identical with revolution, then let us follow the logic and term everything that actively opposes it as a counterrevolution [7, pp 144-145]. And this thesis of the author, it turns out, serves as the premise for far-reaching political conclusions. In the aims of continuing the revolution and preventing counterrevolution, he proposes a form of "coexistence and mutual aid of the CPSU and parity, that is, equal, large social organizations" [Ibid., p 170]. The author considers it essential to first establish special political organizations for the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the workers. All of this, in his opinion, is essential for "applying diverse political pressure on the bureaucracy with the aid of various initiative organizations, including political parties operating on parity principles with the CPSU" [Ibid., p 159].

But if political organizations and parties of the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the working class are established, then what is the class essence and role of the CPSU? In order to understand the author's position on the given question, it is essential to compare it with the assertion that in Soviet society "the production-managerial personnel which in numbers exceeds the kolkhoz peasantry as finally developed as a new sociopolitical class" [Ibid., pp 151-162]. And hence, as the author proposes, the question should be raised of "whom

the CPSU currently serves: the people or this class?" [Ibid., p 167]. The author does not provide a direct answer to this question, referring it to other researchers. But the course of his reasoning is rather transparent and the answer is obvious.

As a counterbalance to such pseudological reasoning, one must again and again emphasize the all-encompassing nature of the Leninist party. The results of the elections of the people's deputies in April 1989 with particular clarity showed the recognition of the party as the political vanguard of all the Soviet people as its membership was 88 percent communists elected by the free expression of the will of all social strata and all nationalities. The preelection debates and the contest of the candidates basically occurred not on the level of putting the interests of certain social groups in opposition to others, but along the problem of the ways and means for accelerating socioeconomic development and renewing all aspects of the life of Soviet society in the interests of all social groups and all nations, all workers.

The establishing of political parties along socioclass lines in Soviet society which as a whole has reached sociopolitical unity would mean not movement forward, toward further social integration, but rather backwards, to an intensification and deepening of differentiation and to a heightening of class contradictions. And this would impede the realizing of the principles of social justice, and advance toward evening out the levels and conditions of life for the various strata of the population and to their consistent consolidation. Ultimately, the cause of revolutionary perestroika, of radical economic reform and democratization, the rebirth and strengthening of generally recognized moral principles in social life, in ideology and the conduct of people would suffer.

The CPSU, as the political vanguard of the Soviet people, embodies their sociopolitical unity, it consolidates and directs their creative forces to solving arising problems of social development, as well as at increasing prosperity, the education and culture of all workers. In terms of its ideology and program goals, in terms of membership and organizational structure, the party has the opportunity to consider, generalize, coordinate and express in its policy of the vital interests of all strata of society and all its social and national groups.

Of course, the diversity of the social structure and the national-ethnic composition of the population within the context of the overall sociopolitical unity of the people even with a single party cannot help but give rise to different views and attitudes. Along with the leading and determining Marxist-Leninist ideology there do exist and clearly will still exist for a long time to come other ideological currents. Religious and all sorts of mystical beliefs and convictions still are widespread. Also felt are conservative and leftist-Utopian ideological aspirations as well as nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes. The contradictions and difficulties which have built up and become exacerbated in previous years are now, under the

conditions of glasnost, bursting out, they are engendering a clash of interests and demands from different groups of the population, and are being manifested in social tension and acute conflict situations. Far from everyone shares the same views and assessments on the questions of perestroika, the forms and methods of organizing work under the conditions of a revolutionary renewal of social life.

Without the ideological unity of the communists, the party is unable to be the political vanguard of the people and carry out an integrating, directing role in society. Under the conditions of glasnost, the free elections of party and state bodies, the leaders of social organizations and enterprises, no organizational or administrative measures can ensure the political leadership of the Communist Party over the development of a socialist society either with a single-party system or a multiparty one.

Experience shows that organizational measures for influencing the party bodies, even up to the level of the CPSU Central Committee, do not bring the expected results, when they do not consider the sociopsychological situation and are not based on a convincing ideological foundation. Moreover, they evoke a negative response and lead to unpredictable consequences. The party can ensure its organizational unity and leading sociopolitical influence, maintain and strengthen its authority in the people under the condition of the ideological solidarity of the communists on principles of Marxism-Leninism.

Socialist pluralism, in contrast to the pluralism in societies with antagonistic classes and contradictory class interests and, correspondingly, class ideologies, does not have an antagonistic class basis but expresses the diversity of social life and forms of social development. In a socialist society, there are no preconditions for a "shattered conscience" brought about by the opposition and clash of antagonistic classes. But this does not eliminate the necessity for the ideological unity of the party and there still are the tasks of disseminating and establishing in society a Marxist-Leninist ideology, overcoming the ideological currents opposing it as well as antisocialist, nationalistic, mystical and other prejudices. Any weakening or vacillation in the socialist ideology provides scope for disseminating alien ideological influences and speculation.

Certainly here it is a question of the party as a whole, as a living social organism consisting of a multiplicity of individuals who are different in their social origin and nationality, in their job and official position, age and length of party membership, education and level of ideological-political training, those who were members of the Komsomol and who were not and so forth. And no one would take it into his head that they all think and believe alike and all adhere to the same views and convictions. Socialist pluralism exists not only in society as a whole but within the ranks of the party itself. Nor is it guaranteed against the pressure and influence on its members of alien ideological currents.

All of this emphasizes the exceptional importance of ideological work by the party and ideological unity within the party itself, as a Marxist-Leninist political organization. The independence and individuality of a communist, the dignity and self-expression of his personality, his personal convictions do not prevent him from being a like-thinker on questions of party loyalty, when the question arises of the ideology and political course of the party as a whole.

Here it is essential to emphasize that the party's ideological unity has nothing in common with sectarian exclusiveness and dogmatic restrictiveness, with isolation and separation from diverse social movements and ideological currents in the modern world. Marxism arose on the basis of a critical assimilation of the entire progressive heritage of previous generations and has continuously developed in the common channel of all positive knowledge attained by mankind and in a struggle against reactionary ideological currents.

Socialist pluralism does not oppose and cannot oppose the ideological unity of the communist party, as the unity is the condition of its leading and integrating role in the social and spiritual life of society. The communist party is an organization of like-thinking persons who have set the goal of freeing labor from all forms of exploitation and alienation and of building a humane society of free, equal citizens on a basis of social justice.

The general course of the party guided by Marxist-Leninist theory can be correct and reliable if it takes into account and generalizes all the uniqueness of the particular and concrete in social life and public opinion, the difference in living conditions, views and attitudes among the communists and all the workers. Such a course is elaborated by the collective creativity of the party and is shaped by the leading bodies on the basis of constant contact with the masses.

The party course when defined by a single individual or a narrow group of associates in isolation from the party organizations and from the masses immediately deviates from Marxist-Leninist positions and leads to the severest tragic consequences, as happened during the Stalinist regime.

The collectively elaborated course is tested out by practice and is collectively adjusted in accord with the requirements of practice. The realization of the general political line is carried out in specific forms depending upon the particular features of the situation by the specific organizations and by individuals employing different approaches, forms and procedures of action. But precisely on the basis of the common, collectively elaborated party course and not by particular, spontaneous ways which contradict this course or distort it. This fundamental tenet of Leninism is particularly important under current conditions of a revolutionary restructuring of society, when intense searches and practical testing are underway for new approaches in solving socioeconomic, political and moral problems.

It is wise to recall in this context Lenin's words relating to revolutionary periods: "Deviation or a lack of principle on theoretical questions in precisely a revolutionary era are tantamount to complete ideological bankruptcy, for precisely now it is essential to have an elaborated and firm ideology in order that the socialist masters the events and not events which master him" [2]. And at present, the CPSU is giving unflagging attention to the ideological support of perestroika, in focusing the party organizations on strengthening the ideological-political and moral indoctrination of the communists and all the Soviet people, at strengthening socialist awareness and overcoming the deformations of socialism.

At the same time, we must not close our eyes to the fact that the speeches by certain communists during the election campaign and also at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies contained a goodly dose of demagoguery and unprincipledness and departed far from the course being carried out by the party of perestroika on the basis of the consistent realization of socialist principles. A political assessment of such deviations from the party positions has had its positive impact without having to employ disciplinary conclusions. This stresses that the ideological basis of party policy in carrying out perestroika is an essential prerequisite for the conscious involvement of the communists in its realization and the basis of their ideological unity.

But this does not exclude and rather presupposes that the violating of the standards of party life and the Soviet laws by the communists and the perpetrating of illegal actions by extremist and criminal elements entail a severe punishment, respectively, through party and court procedures. The party protects its ideological banner, the purity of its ranks, the high calling of the communists by employing both educational work and disciplinary measures in accord with the party Bylaws.

At the same time that perestroika has moved from the realm of theory into practice and has assumed the character of a broad popular movement for the revolutionary renewal of society and for shifting it to a new qualitative state, the debates are still continuing and are becoming even more complicated over what is the essence of the developing revolution, on what basis it will occur and what will be its result.

Perestroika is rightly termed a continuation of the revolutionary cause of Great October and a transition to a new appearance of socialism. It assumes the complete elimination of all the deformations of socialism and a resolution of the profound contradictions which have built up between the needs for increasing the productive forces, scientific-technical progress and the ossified production relations, and includes a fundamental economic reform, a transformation of the forms of ownership and distribution, the break up of administrative-bureaucratic methods of administration, the democratizing of the political system, the real granting of all rights and powers to the soviets as a state form of authority expressing the

interests and will of all the people, as a form of their self-management and complete power.

Ultimately, it is a question of the all-round development of the individual, of establishing the socioeconomic, political-legal and cultural prerequisites for an ongoing rise in labor productivity and the strengthening of labor order in order to teach and accustom all people to work conscientiously and well from the managers and specialists of the sectors, associations and enterprises, the scientists, workers and peasants, and actually provide for the principle of socialism, that is, from each according to his ability to each according to his labor. Without this an acceleration of economic development, the resolving of social problems and a rise in the people's prosperity are inconceivable.

Certain scientists and writers feel that it is essential to revise our attitude toward the theory of the convergence of socialism and capitalism, and that this theory is supposedly not so far from the truth and must be taken up. It can be assumed that such judgments are dictated by good intentions to bring about an economic upsurge, to eliminate the military-political confrontation on the world scene, and establish a lasting peace and collaboration between peoples, as well as by a desire to see a single socioeconomic system in the future world.

Peaceful coexistence between states is a universal and most humane principle of international relations. But peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist countries does not mean convergence but rather competition and collaboration with different socioeconomic systems and with reciprocal noninterference into internal affairs.

A merging of socialism and capitalism is just as impossible as the combining of fire and water. With water it is possible to limit the spread of a fire or with the use of fire to turn a certain portion of water into steam and take it from an inert state into a propulsive force. But it is impossible to combine them as either the fire will be extinguished or the water will evaporate. Equally hopeless are the intentions to bring together capitalist ownership of the means of production with public, socialist ownership or reconcile the interests and goals of the capitalist and workers. And it is not a question of the remote future but rather the question is a practical one: on what economic basis is perestroika to be carried out? To this question in the party documents we see a definite response as perestroika is to be carried out on socialist principles and on no others, certainly, considering the best experience in world development but not by some path to a mixed "socialist-capitalist system."

It is impossible to mix the achievements of world civilization with the capitalist system, although many major progressive shifts in social development have occurred in the capitalist age. But these successes were achieved by the common efforts of mankind and the main engine



of history has always been the people and their creative productive force has accelerated scientific-technical and social progress of mankind.

And here it is particularly important to have a correct, authentically dialectical understanding of the relationships between the class the general-human in historical development. While civilization has developed in societies divided into opposing and conflicting classes under the rule of the possessing exploiting social groups, this does not mean that all its components had a class nature. The development of the productive forces, science and technology, the rational organization of production, the permanent cultural and moral values, democratic principles and general legal standards, of course, have been employed by exploiting classes, this has occurred under their aegis, it has been clouded by their class ideology but in and of itself has been a common human achievement.

Lenin reminded us that precisely Marxism, as the ideology of the revolutionary working class, teaches us to distinguish the exploiting side of the capitalist factory and its organizational aspect based upon joint labor and united by conditions of technically highly-developed production [see 3].

Yes, we for a long time have taken a dogmatic approach to history, without delimiting the class and the common-human in its heritage, we have assumed a position of isolationism, including in scientific and technical progress and in the organization of production, and we have underestimated and even ignored what was valuable that had been created and is being created in societies with a different class nature. But this does not provide grounds to go to the other extreme of confusing the assimilation of the accomplishments of world civilization as a common human achievement with the merging of the two social systems which are the opposite in their class essence. Such a mixing has no real prospects.

In time, all mankind will reach the common principles of economic life with its highly rational organization, without a separation into classes with a varying attitude toward the means of production. But, of course, this is not to be done by bringing together the socialist and capitalist economic systems. But it would be dangerously dogmatic to deny under the guise of the "purity" of the principles of socialism, the danger of bourgeois "penetration" and "influence" the need for professional ties with the capitalist states or the necessity of studying and adopting their modern accomplishments in science and technology, in the organization of production and in trade and consumer services.

Under the conditions of isolation, socialism can grow decrepit and become divorced from the development of world civilization, as a common-human historical process. Such a position is beneficial only to those who presently feel that the October revolution was premature, since the nation did not possess the ready prerequisites of socialism and should have created them on a

capitalist basis, as then supposedly it would have been easier to move on to a socialist society and avoid the enormous losses and sacrifices of the Civil War and the grievous tragedy of the criminal Stalinist repressions.

Here they refer to authorities, including to Plekhanov who supposedly warned that Russia had not reached the stage of socialism and that the prematurely commenced socialist changes would end in despotism. Here they pretend that they do not know how Lenin replied to such prophecies by the opponents of Great October. "For creating socialism, you say, it is essential to have civilization. Very good. But why are we unable to first create such prerequisites of civilization in our country as expelling the landowners and expelling the Russian capitalists, and then begin movement toward socialism? In what books have you read that such an alternation of ordinary historical order is inadmissible or impossible?" [4].

In remaining silent about such a positing of the question or in spite of it, they refer to the fact that in Tsarist Russia industry was developing, many newspapers were being published and literacy was on the rise. Here they forget that Russia more and more was falling into a serf-like dependence on the developed capitalist powers, it had been involved in a bloody and destructive imperialist battle and by 1917 was on the brink of a complete disaster and universal collapse. Tsarism and the Provisional Government brought the nation to a hopeless situation and it was precisely the Great October Revolution which was able to lead it out of this.

The natural alternative to the October Revolution could have been, as Lenin pointed out, only a dictatorship of the extreme reactionaries like Kornilov and this was decisively rejected by the revolutionary people [5].

One cannot help but be alarmed by the fact that in their aggregate the ideas of founding other "class" parties on a parity with the CPSU, of the prospects of convergence between socialism and capitalism or a possible alternative to Great October, would provide grounds for various misinterpretations and distortions of the essence of perestroika which is occurring in our country. And we are unable to agree with the assertion that such ideas are in keeping with the revolutionary renewal of the theory and practice of socialism. Certainly, under the conditions of the development of socialist pluralism, the voicing of various views and disputed opinions is a natural thing. But this is not grounds for producing dubious and incorrect ideas concerning the ideological basis and expression of perestroika.

The communists cannot avoid the ideological clash and ideological counteraction with views incompatible with Leninism, or avoid an open debate and principled polemics, disregard or avoid the method of persuasion as a democratic form of socialist pluralism. It is not an issue of the directive condemnation of various viewpoints concerning acute questions of theory and modern times. But there must be a more profound elaboration of them and a sound line of reasoning to the conclusions. It is



essential to have a responsible approach to the debated questions, proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism on which is based the ideological unity of the party and the forming of the socialist society's ideology.

Revolutionary perestroika on the basis of socialism and along the lines of the fuller disclosure of all its capabilities, its creative potential and humanistic ideal in accord with the creative teachings of Marxism-Leninism—this, in our understanding, is the criterion in terms of the growing diversity of opinions and judgments under the conditions of socialist democracy and socialist pluralism.

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### Authority of Social Organizations

905D0006B Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 23-28

[Article by Galina Mikhaylovna Vokhmentseva, candidate of philosophical sciences and assistant on the Philosophy Faculty of the Urals State University. She has appeared in our journal with a review (No 3, 1981). Olga Pavlovna Kamayeva is a graduate student on the same faculty. Aleksandr Leonidovich Ilin is a candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Urals Polytechnical Institute. This is the first time the last two authors appear in our journal]

[Text] For a long time the involvement of youth in social life was of a purely nominal sort. The young men and women, as no other social group, were educated with particular zeal. And this was understandable as in possessing minimum material sufficiency, experience and opportunities for the expression and realization of their interests, the young people served as an ideal object of

manipulation in the hands of the administrative system. The envoys of the Komsomol enthusiastically developed new territories, leaving behind them enterprise buildings in the uninhabited tayga and wrote out requests to be sent to serve in Afghanistan.

At present, when the time of truth and sobriety has come, among the youth complex sociopolitical processes are underway and these have been caused, on the one hand, by the desire to support and develop perestroika actively and, on the other, by a mistrust in many existing social institutions and values by which pseudointerests have been imposed on the young men and women. Drawing on materials of empirical research, let us endeavor to bring out the attitude of the youth toward the main sociopolitical institutions of our society and primarily toward the party and the Komsomol.<sup>1</sup>

### Who Is Who In Perestroika?

The most important factor determining the attitude of young people to the party is the notion of its role in carrying out perestroika. We judged this primarily from to what degree those questioned know about the basic directions of perestroika as outlined in the recent party documents. The adequate concepts were distributed in the following order: maximum development of democracy and self-government—58.1 percent; economic reform and the realizing of full cost accounting—51.2 percent; the broadening of glasnost, the establishing of a pluralism of opinions—39.4 percent; the creating of a state under the law—27.3 percent (a respondent could mark several positions).

As we can see, for a maturity of the respondents perestroika was perceived as a range of political, economic and spiritual changes. However, there were also many (totaling 30.7 percent) inadequate replies. Some 19.2 percent felt that there would be a growing influence of the managerial apparatus on social life. Over 10 percent of those questioned chose versions showing that among the youth there are such viable stereotypes and notions as: "a merciless struggle against the enemies of socialism" (9.4 percent) and "strict control over the distribution of information" (3.9 percent). This not-so-small group of young people could become the social basis for the forces opposed to political reform.

The experts who were asked the question in an open form assessed the main areas of perestroika raised by the party in virtually the same way: some 2/3 noted the fundamental economic reform; almost 1/2 pointed to the broadening of democracy and glasnost, and further (in a diminishing order) mentioned the reform in the political system and the establishing of a state of law, the "deformation" of the social institutions, the creating of a multiparty system and so forth.

In establishing the attitude of the respondents toward perestroika and their notions about its goals and directions, we concluded that the political position of a

significant portion of those questioned cannot be considered formed. The questionnaire asks the question: "Who, in your opinion, has made the greatest contribution to perestroika?" The replies were distributed in the following manner: M.S. Gorbachev (41.9 percent), the councils of the labor collectives (25.9 percent), the public informal movements (23.2 percent), the CPSU (20.4 percent), the cooperatives (15.3 percent), the party-state apparatus (8.6 percent), the trade unions (7.4 percent), the Komsomol (6.2 percent), the soviets (3.7 percent), the army (1.5 percent), the public security bodies (1.0 percent) (a respondent could mark several positions).

Thus, the General Secretary was viewed as having made the greatest contribution and the maximum low level was the social institutions included in the state administrative system. Characteristically, the youth assigned a greater role to the social informal movements than to the CPSU, and this fact merits serious analysis.

The ranking of preferences was the same for all the groups: Spearman's coefficient for the workers and students equaled +0.93 and for the workers, engineers and technicians it was +0.95. Incidentally, there are individual discrepancies for the groups. Opinions split on the councils of the labor collectives with the workers who were familiar with the activities of the councils from their own experience giving them much less importance than the engineers and technicians. The representatives of different social groups had a varying view of the contribution to perestroika by the public informal movements. Students, engineers and technicians viewed their contribution as twice as high as the workers. Among all the categories of those questioned, the CPSU encountered the least support among the engineers and technicians.

The experts provided somewhat different replies. In first place in terms of the number of mentionings here also was M.S. Gorbachev, although there were fewer such answers than in the overall sampling, a little more than 1/3. At the same time, almost 1 out of 4 experts, that is, more than in the basic sample, noted the leading role of the CPSU in perestroika.

The contribution to perestroika by the party bodies of different levels was perceived differently (Table 1). The respondents again viewed the role of M.S. Gorbachev as the highest. Generally, there was a direct dependence between the level of the party organization and the assessment of it: the lower the level, the lower the assessment. As a whole, the contribution of the party committees to perestroika, from the viewpoint of the respondents, was very insignificant: from "below average" (CPSU Obkom) to "almost complete absence of any contribution" (party buro secretary). In addition, one must also note the large number who did not reply to the question, almost 1/2. This shows a poor knowledge of the activities of not only the "upper stories" but also their own party organization.

**Table 1:**  
**Assessment of Contribution to Perestroika**  
**by Party Bodies and Their Leaders**

Party Body, Its Leader	Average Points*	Not Giving Definite Answer (%)
CPSU Central Committee	3.5	35.7
Politburo	3.4	35.0
General Secretary	4.2	29.6
CPSU Obkom	2.9	42.1
Secretary of CPSU Obkom	2.7	44.8
CPSU Gorkom	2.8	46.3
Secretary of CPSU Gorkom	2.6	47.0
CPSU Raykom	2.7	46.6
Secretary of CPSU Raykom	2.7	49.0
Party Committee of enterprise, institution	2.7	44.3
Secretary of party organization	2.6	44.3
Party buro	2.6	45.3
Party buro secretary	2.5	47.0

\* According to 5-point scale.

It is felt that it is precisely the opinion about the work of the party organization in the collective where the respondent is a member that causes the restrained attitude of many persons questioned toward the CPSU. But judging from the replies, the state of affairs in the primary organizations is far from good: only 1 out of 10 (9.8 percent) viewed the communists of their shop, department or faculty as an active participant of renewal or an initiator of perestroika. Over 1/2 (52.9 percent) felt that the communists supported the changes in word alone and had taken a wait-and-see stance. Some 12.1 percent felt that the CPSU members in their collective were skeptical or even negative toward perestroika. Some 35 percent noted a certain activeness among the communists. Among the workers the numbers of those indicating a wait-and-see stance of the communists was somewhat greater than in the other groups of respondents (64.3 percent in comparison with 38.7 percent among the students).

The assessments of the experts as a whole coincided with the opinion of the questioned Komsomol members (it must be considered that for the communists experts this was a self-assessment and for this reason it could be somewhat overstated). Nevertheless, 2/3 of the experts characterized the position of the communists as wait-and-see, passive ("they are waiting for instructions from above," "they are skeptical," "the next campaign," "I am a little person" and so forth). Only 1/4 noted increased activity among the CPSU members.

As a whole, the replies to this block of questions show the high criticalness of the young persons questioned in terms of both the individual party organizations as well as the CPSU as a whole (with the exception of the activities of M.S. Gorbachev).

### An Imaginary Reserve

The Komsomol respondents provided rather low views (the same, incidentally, as the soviets and trade unions). And the particular dramaticness of the situation lies in the fact that in the given instance the young people know the state of affairs from inside. Some 72.2 percent of those questioned felt that the Komsomol had lost authority and only 3.7 percent were convinced that it did a good job in carrying out the role as educator of the youth. The opinion of the experts was largely analogous with  $\frac{1}{3}$  considering that the authority of the Komsomol had declined while the remainder more often noted versions of this: "disorganized," "the interests of the youth are not realized in the Komsomol," "the Komsomol merely impedes the youth" and "there is no feeling of responsibility on a state scale."

Thus, the obtained data show that a large portion of the respondents does not link his participation in political activity with the Komsomol and this shows the need for its immediate and fundamental restructuring.

Was membership in the Komsomol for the young persons an experiment in real political activity? The questionnaire showed that admission to the Komsomol was scarcely linked with a conscious recognition of the program position of the organization. Some  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the respondents explained this event by the fact that "everyone joined,"  $\frac{1}{10}$  was "forced by the teacher" and only 20 percent joined the Komsomol out of conviction. Thus, if one adheres to the letter of the bylaws, only the representatives of the last group, that is, just  $\frac{1}{5}$  of those questioned, are actual Komsomol members. In taking these facts into attention, should one be surprised that quite often the Komsomol organizers for years seek out negligent Komsomol members who have not been expelled, while the secretaries who do not want to make a fool of themselves pay the dues of the "dead souls" out of their own pocket or "scatter" rubles and kopecks over the disciplined Komsomol members.

The Komsomol is the "reserve of the party" and the "school of the communist" and hence it would be natural for the "students" to be admitted to the party after successfully completing this school. Only the "failures" should be an exception. And here, in our view, lies a contradiction in the very definition of the youth organization as a "mass communist organization." If it is a mass one, then clearly the demands on the political position and ideological persuasion of its members should not be as rigid as they are formulated in the bylaws. What up to now we have called the sociopolitical activities of the Komsomol member has a formal and predominantly executive nature and, of course, does not provide any experience in real political activity, that is, conscious involvement in defending the interests of a specific social group. Moreover, the youth organization has been rather conservative in the era of rapid changes in society and this has not contributed to its increased authority.

### To Join the Party or Not?

An important problem requiring special attention and study is the motives and factors causing a young person

to take the decision to join the party. Among our respondents there were 8.1 percent so inclined. The research disclosed definite changes in the ideas concerning admission to the CPSU. Some 15.3 percent of those who previously sought this recently changed their minds. This trend was particularly apparent among the white collar personnel. The reverse trend—the changing of a negative view for a positive one—was much less expressed with these being 6.4 percent among those questioned. The most mobile views on admission to the party was found among white collar personnel (they had the maximum indicator both for a negative and positive orientation) and the least among workers (both indicators were minimal). Most probably this is caused by differences in the perception by the representatives of these groups of those changes which are occurring in society, the party and daily life (the views of the workers are steadier).

A large portion of the respondents (36.7 percent), in replying to the question "Do you have a desire to join the Communist Party?" marked the alternative "have not thought about this." There were particularly many such persons among the students.

Of those who wanted to become a CPSU member, some 39 percent of those questioned considered such a possibility realistic, while 32.2 percent felt that they would have to make a significant effort for this while 20 percent of the respondents felt that their desire was unattainable. The remainder did not provide a definite answer and this most probably shows the abstractness of the very idea of admission to the CPSU.

One should also note the fact that over  $\frac{1}{2}$  the potential CPSU members anticipated difficulties in being admitted to the party. What, in the opinion of those questioned, were the real conditions for this? The most important, from the viewpoint of the respondents, was active involvement in social work. In second place were the personal qualities of the candidate, and the workers viewed the importance of this factor higher than social activeness. Those questioned mentioned professional qualities as a third significant factor for admission to the party. Some 29.8 percent of the respondents marked the opinion "It is essential to be a good production worker." The designated factor held third place.

The increased attention paid to the socially significant qualities of a candidate party member makes it possible to draw a valid conclusion of the need for the broader participation of the collectives in admitting new members to the CPSU as well as the more accurate and complete consideration of the opinion of colleagues. This would help in a more just and objective assessment of the candidates.

Among the other factors for admission to the CPSU, 7.9 percent of those questioned pointed out that it was enough to submit a request, while 8.6 percent felt that the main thing was the questionnaire data. This opinion more often was supported by white collar personnel. A

portion of those questioned felt that admission to the CPSU depended primarily upon good relations with superiors (8.9 percent) or inclusion in a recruitment order (8.1 percent).

Unfortunately, the practices of recruiting to fill out the party ranks by coopting is still far from over. The experts, in contrast to the respondents, were completely definite about this. In their opinion, in the admitting of workers to the party, the following factors play a role (in diminishing order): the presence of a request; length of employment of at least a year; production indicators; questionnaire data; other circumstances. The conversations with experts uniformly show a clear decline in demands on workers being admitted to the CPSU. In particular, the opinion was voiced that any worker could become a communist who did not have flagrant violations of discipline (consignment to a sobering-up station, being sent to the police and so forth). And the facts of profaning the procedure for admitting workers to the party are, unfortunately, far from isolated.

For the admission of white collar personnel to the party, the criteria are somewhat different (also in diminishing order): active social work; good production indicators; the corresponding category; the interest of the institution in increasing the cadres and other circumstances.

An essential factor influencing a person's desire to join the party is the opinion of persons around, friends, relatives and work colleagues. Unfortunately, at present such a decision far from always is unconditionally supported. Only 10.6 percent of the respondents, in replying to the question "How would a majority of your friends and close comrades react if they learned of your decision to join the party?" could count on approval. Incidentally, an overtly negative attitude is also a rarity: only 3.2 percent of those questioned marked the alternative "would condemn this." Around 1/2 (44.6 percent) feel that the reaction of friends and comrades would be mixed. Actually, 1 out of every 4 respondents (26.4 percent) could not predict the opinion of those around on this matter. It is worthy of note that only 14 percent of those questioned were indifferent to the response of colleagues and acquaintances.

Thus, a person who has determined to join the party can encounter an unfavorable response in his referent group. Only 1 out of every 4 was confident of a positive or at least neutral attitude toward his decision. The remainder assumed at best a mixed response. The most favorable emotional and psychological background for taking the decision to join the party was in the worker and student groups.

What are the reasons that certain Komsomol members do not want to become party members? A clarifying question was proposed for the young persons who replied in the negative to the question of their intention to join the CPSU. The following became apparent. Only an insignificant portion of this group (3.8 percent) did not share the strategic aims and political platform of the

CPSU. Also unsubstantial was the share of reasons such as "no time for party affairs" (11.3 percent) or "I do not want to assume responsibility" (13.4 percent). The most significant are the social factors which have recently been frequently mentioned on various levels. Above all, this is the discrepancy between word and deed and this was noted by 92.5 percent of those questioned. This confirmed one of the main hypotheses of research linking the reduced influx of members into the CPSU from the ranks of the Komsomol to a lack of confidence in the practical political activities and in the system for recruiting the cadres.

There is a definite contradiction in the awareness of the youth: there is the party the goals and tasks of which are accepted and shared by a predominant majority of the youth (let us recall that only 3.8 percent did not share the political platform of the party). There is a party leader who possesses great authority. At the same time, there is mistrust in the party apparatus, since "there there is a great deal of bureaucracy and formalism" (78.5 percent), "the opinion of the ordinary communist does not mean anything" (59.1 percent) and "the party lost authority during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation" (39.2 percent). The ideals were not subjected to any serious doubts. But if words are not backed up by real deeds, if the position of the communists in the collective is not altered, these ideals with the current high criticalness of the youth, inevitably will be put into doubt.

It is also essential to consider that at present admission to the ranks of the CPSU is not the only way for manifesting the social activeness of the youth. There are also other forms in which a young person can realize himself. As research has shown, for those who do not intend to join the party, the most preferable way to show oneself in the social area is participation in the various informal movements (43.5 percent). Then follow: work in the trade unions (26.3 percent of those questioned), individual actions without involvement in any social structure (17.1 percent), work in the labor collective councils (14.5 percent) and participation in the activities of another political party (13.4 percent). Least interest was shown in the work of the soviets with 7.5 percent (a respondent could mark several positions). It is not hard to note that the distribution of the preferred forms of sociopolitical activity in principle corresponds to the assessment by the correspondents of the contribution of the various social organizations to perestroika.

The democratization of the nation's political life means not only increased activities for people within traditional institutions (and possibly not so much as these institutions are often late in responding to the rapid changes in sociopolitical life), but also the abandoning of the monopoly of political activities solely within the party and Komsomol. Incidentally, in assessing the possible forms of the political activeness of the youth, the experts gave even more votes to the informal groups (2/3) than did the Komsomol members themselves. Curiously, as of now, only 4 percent of those questioned are members of

such association and readiness for these activities, of course, does not mean that in the near future a majority will join the informal groups. But a certain portion of the youth (and clearly a significant one) will certainly go there.

The youth hungers for energetic action and at the same time a passionate, critical view of the traditional structures is characteristic of it. The orientation is not only for a pluralism of opinions but also a pluralism of actions. Politics is ceasing to be the area of the select and is becoming a standard of daily life. Correspondingly, the attitude toward the traditional forms of political activity is changing. The party at present has set out on a course of decisively abandoning the administrative methods. Only in broadening and deepening the political influence on other sociopolitical forces and structures and by dialogue with them will the party win true authority based not on coercion but rather on persuasion and moral trust.

#### Footnote

1. The research was conducted in 1988 by a sociological group from the Sverdlovsk Komsomol Obkom. The selective aggregate was formed using a quota sampling and this was based on the feature of social position. Some 406 Komsomol members were questioned in Sverdlovsk as well as 36 experts participating in forming the party reserve (secretaries of the party organizations, party buro members, members of the Komsomol committees, secretaries of the Komsomol organizations and Komsomol organizers).

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#### Voter Secrets

905D0006D Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 29-35

[Article by Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Demidov, candidate of philosophical sciences and sector head at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published his article "Portrait of a Broken Family: Research of Finnish Sociologists" (No 3, 1985)]

[Text] Secret voting in elections is guaranteed by our Constitution. This is one of the most important conditions for the free expression of the people's will. However, the mentioned principle in no way excludes the need to know the mass moods of the voters. All historical experience shows that without such information, free agitation and healthy rivalry between candidates and an adequate expression and defending of the interests of their voters are inconceivable—in a word, truly democratic elections are impossible. The desire of the political and social organizations to ascertain the opinions and judgments of people and to consider them in the election campaign is completely natural. The question is, does this not violate the law and moral standards. As of now, mankind has not invented any better method satisfying

the mentioned demands for penetrating into the "secrets" of the voters than science.

Unfortunately, Soviet sociology possesses extremely insignificant experience in the given regard. The turning point was the elections of the USSR People's Deputies held in March of this year. The research devoted to the public's attitude toward the new election system was conducted by numerous leading sociological centers in the nation and primarily by those specialized in studying public opinion [1].

The Sector for the Study of the Public Opinion of Muscovites under the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences for a month before the elections of the people's deputies on 26 March 1989 and directly after their conclusion conducted a series of voter polls in the capital.\* The research program envisaged forecasting the voting results in certain of the capital's electoral districts, ascertaining the opinion of the Muscovites concerning the course of the election campaign and their attitude toward the voting system, as well as determining the judgments of the results of the elections by the Moscow voters and the degree to which their expectations were realized.

Forecasting the voting results represents a qualitatively new task in Soviet sociology if only because up to now there was nothing to forecast in this area. In working out the program, we propose obtaining an answer to two questions: For whom the Muscovites would be voting and for why. Incidentally, the task was posed of ascertaining to what degree the voters were informed on the candidate people's deputies in the various stages of the election campaign and their readiness to participate in the voting.

#### Voting for an Unknown Candidate

The first question which arose in preparing the instrumentarium: Did the voters know their candidates, or was it necessary to provide at least minimum information about them in the questionnaire? We followed the second path and were correct. The poll conducted just 2 weeks before the elections indicated that the level of information about the candidates was very low. Thus, in the Sevastopolskiy Territorial District, around 1/2 of the respondents had virtually no knowledge of their candidates. In the Pervomayskiy Territorial District, the share of uninformed was 52 percent. Understandably, under such conditions the question "For whom would you vote?" without preliminary information on the candidates did not make it possible to obtain reliable data on their chances. In this instance, the forecast had to be made proceeding merely from the number of those who were well informed and this was just 1/2 of the voters and these differed from the remainder in terms of a number of qualitative indicators.

The next problem was the wording of the question for whom those questioned intended to vote. Of course, the direct question of "For whom are you voting?" would be unacceptable, as it would be viewed as an encroachment on the secret ballot and would have evoked a negative response.

In relying on world experience, we worded the question as follows: "If we held the elections today, for whom would you vote?" After listing the candidates, the alternative was also provided of "At present it would be difficult to answer this question." On the other hand, the possibility of "avoiding an answer" impeded the forecasting of the results (for instance, in Sevastopol District some 15 days before the elections, 42 percent of those questioned had still not chosen). On the other hand, the share of refusals declined (to the question in the questionnaire, only 2 percent did not reply). In the course of a telephone poll on the eve of the elections, we eliminated the alternative "hard to reply," replacing it with an alternative "against all candidates," that is, we simulated the situation of the real elections. In the given instance, 16 percent of those questioned refused to reply, stating that they still had not decided upon their candidate or wished to keep their choice a secret. Nevertheless, the number of persons refusing to reply was not so great. In conducting a similar telephone poll in Leningrad, the share of such respondents was even lower [2]. Probably, here an important role is played by local conditions.

A different situation existed in the elections for the national territorial district in Moscow, where the candidates were the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosstroy [State Committee for Construction], B.N. Yeltsin and the General Director of the AvtoZIL [Automotive Plant imeni Likhachev] Association, Ye.A. Brakov. The voter poll was conducted in the same territorial districts (Sevastopolskiy, Pervomayskiy and Dzerzhinskiy Rayons), but following a different questionnaire.

First of all, one should note that in the given instance the level of information was significantly higher: only 9 percent of those questioned did not know anything about the candidates. The reasons lie on the surface. In the first place, there were just 2 candidates and not 12 as in one of the districts. Secondly, the mass information media were able to give them much more attention than to the remainder. Incidentally, the respondents mentioned the following basic sources of information concerning the candidates in the national territorial districts (the question was posed separately for each candidate): the press, radio and television (53 percent, 69 percent), leaflets, posters and other agitation materials (26, 31), speeches by the candidates themselves (16, 27) and the stories of friends, acquaintances (9, 17).

As a whole, it is possible to draw the following conclusions. The election campaign rightly remained in our memory as a period of extremely high activeness by the public, passions heated up and there was a dramatic struggle of the candidates. At the same time, the polling results indicated that a very significant portion of the people was not particularly interested in the events going on. We will take up certain reasons for this below.

#### Who Will Win? A Sociologist's Version

Why did the Muscovites elect one or another candidate? Among the main reasons are: the attractiveness of the election platform and the confidence that he would better carry out the wishes of the voters. At the same

time, we should also note the rather high percentage of unmotivated or poorly motivated preferences ("I simply like him more," "I know him better," "It is hard to say why I chose him") (see Table 1). It must be pointed out that in those districts where we conducted the polls, only an insignificant portion of the voters expressed a negative attitude toward the other candidates or candidate, that is, the choice was made on the basis of negation. As a whole, a favorable or, as a minimum, a neutral attitude was apparent also in the replies to the proposal to voice in a most general form an opinion about the candidate deputies. The maximum share of unfavorable assessments was 7-9 percent.

**Table 1:**  
**Motives for Preferring One or Another Candidate**  
**(Respondent Could Check Several Positions)**

Motives	% of Those Replying
I share the candidate's election platform	40
I feel that he will carry out the wishes of the voters better	38
I like him more	23
I know this candidate but not th others	17
Difficult to answer why I chose this candidate	6
I do not like the other candidate or candidates	2

Among the other factors for choosing one or another candidate (the question was posed only in the questionnaire for the national territorial district), of greatest importance were his personal qualities and popularity among those about and in third place was the certainty that he would win without fail. It is worthy of note that the position held, social origin and the ability to speak well were at the tail end of the scale of priorities.

In addition to a knowledge of the reasons for the choice, the selection of the respondents was also important for an accurate forecast. Understandably, in carrying out this task it was essential to be guided solely by the voters of a specific district. We immediately abandoned the construct of a quota sampling, primarily due to the absence of statistical data characterizing the general aggregate of the territorial district. The random choice method was used with the voter rolls. In one of the districts, the source was the general voter roll. In the two others, the respondents were selected randomly (increasing from a set number) from the rolls of one out of every three electoral sections. In all the districts, the sample aggregate corresponded to the population's structure of the district rayon.

The most vulnerable place was the quality of the primary information assembled by the volunteer interviewers. Additional difficulties were created by the short time for conducting the research. In one district, the return of the questionnaires was around 50 percent and in the other two up to 90 percent, however in the given instance cases

were spotted of the unconscientious collecting of information by the interviewers (the filling out of the questionnaires by the interviewers themselves). At the same time, there were no significant systematic errors in the course of selecting the information, while the offsetting action of the random factors did not produce a displacement of the sample while the actual sample aggregate differed insignificantly from the planned.

Forecasting the election results on the basis of the first obtained data posed a number of new questions. A significant portion of the voters did not express their attitude toward the candidates. The placement in Sevastopolskiy District was as follows: O.T. Bogomolov with 28 percent; A.M. Bryachikhin with 19, A.V. Seredenin with 10, 41 did not voice a definite opinion and 2 percent did not reply. In principle, the preferences were clear, however for an accurate forecast it was essential to model the breakdown of the opinions of 43 percent of the undetermined respondents. The calculation based on the answers of persons who had made their choice provided the following picture: Bogomolov with 49, Bryachikhin with 33 and Seredenin with 18. However, there was no complete certainty that the vacillating portion of the voters in 2 weeks would vote like those who had a definite opinion. Moreover, by the moment of the voting the ratio of preferences could alter significantly. (Incidentally, this did happen: in a repeat poll the First Secretary of the Sevastopolskiy CPSU Raykom A.M. Bryachikhin had lost a portion of the "votes.")

For a control, on the eve of the elections in the Sevastopolskiy District, a telephone poll was conducted according to a questionnaire which, as has already been pointed out, had changed the alternative "at present difficult to reply" with the judgment "against both candidates." Having distributed the share of those who did not reply between the candidates in the same ratio as in the sample as a whole, we obtained the following result: Bogomolov with 48 percent, Bryachikhin with 24, Seredenin with 16 and 12 percent against all candidates.

Thus, in comparison with the first poll, the number of supporters for O.T. Bogomolov and A.V. Seredenin remained as before while that of A.M. Bryachikhin dropped somewhat. In an analysis of the results from the telephone poll, certain adjustments had to be incorporated in them. In the structure of respondents, the share of representatives of those population groups which supported O.T. Bogomolov were less than in the first poll (here the accuracy of the representation of the general aggregate was higher). Having reweighed the sample, we prepared a final forecast: 50 percent of the voters voted in favor of O.T. Bogomolov. The results of the voting confirmed the correctness of the assumption with 50.35 percent of the voters for Bogomolov, 20.24 percent for Bryachikhin and 19.9 percent for Seredenin. Thus, the greatest deviation from the forecast was around 4 percent.

We have taken up in detail a description of the situation in Sevastopolskiy District in order to show from this example the mechanism of preparing a forecast of the voting results using voter polls as well as due to the fact that candidates representing different social groups were running in the district: a worker from the party apparatus, an academician and a worker. It must be said that they had varying support among the different voter categories. The white collar personnel preferred the academician candidate. The workers equally supported O.T. Bogomolov and A.M. Bryachikhin and slightly less A.V. Seredenin. Among the CPSU members, Bogomolov was slightly in the lead and A.V. Seredenin was significantly behind. Characteristic of the voters who were CPSU members was that at the moment of the poll they had basically already made their choice (some 18 percent did not voice a definite opinion). No differences were disclosed in preference depending upon sex.

The first polls for the national territorial district disclosed a significant gap between the candidates: Ye.A. Brakov with 7.3 percent, B.N. Yeltsin with 77.9 percent; 13.4 percent did not have a clear opinion and 1.4 percent did not reply. The overall voting result was not difficult to predict, and it was merely a matter of the forecast accuracy. Some 5 days before the voting in one of the three rayons of Moscow, a repeat poll was taken. The alternative "hard to reply" was replaced by the judgment "against both candidates." The results were as follows: Brakov with 6.8 percent, Yeltsin with 88.6; 3.9 against both candidates; 0.7 no reply.

These data were used as the basis of the forecast which was also confirmed with a high degree of accuracy. Some 6.9 percent of the voters voted for Ye.A. Brakov, 89.4 percent for B.N. Yeltsin and 2.1 percent were against both candidates.

Our assumptions on the participation of the public in the voting were confirmed. In the course of the polls, 75-78 percent of the respondents voiced a firm intention to go to the voting stations. An analysis of the entire volume of information made it possible to forecast the participation of 85 percent of the Muscovites in the voting. The actual vote was 83.5 percent. Thus, the sample results confirmed the possibility and effectiveness of forecasting their results with the help of representative voter polls.

### "We Expect Changes..."

What problems are of primary concern for the voters? In assessing the election platforms of the candidates from this viewpoint, the respondents ranked them somewhat differently than a majority of candidates had done (see Table 2). In first place were the housing and ecological questions. It is worthy of note that the problem of supplying food and industrial goods and which usually causes increased dissatisfaction was only in 7th place. But the social problems of the rayon were in 9th place. The voters really did not consider their solution to be the primary task of a USSR people's deputy.



**Table 2:**  
**Distribution of Replies to Question: "What Is the**  
**Most Important in the Candidate Programs?"**  
**(Respondent Could Check Several Positions)**

Problems	% of Those Replying
Solution to housing problem	40.8
Environmental protection	38.7
Creating a state under the law, defense of human rights	27.9
Ensuring just wages	25.2
Improving pension support	23.8
Improving status of women, solving family problems	19.9
Supply of food and industrial goods	19.6
Reducing military expenditures	19.4
Social problems of area	19.1
Public health	18.5
Reform in political system	13.2
Improving economic mechanism	12.3
Combating bureaucracy	10.6
Combating violations of law, abuses, theft	10.6
Solving of youth problems	9.1
Solving of nationality problems	0.9

At the same time, in the course of the election campaign, those questioned had a very restrained assessment of the new voting system. Thus, 27-28 percent of the respondents pointed out that the election campaign was being conducted under qualitatively new conditions, 33-35 percent felt that there were certain changes but as a whole the difference from the previous campaigns was slight, 15-20 percent assumed that "there was more noise, but in essence nothing has changed." Some 18-23 percent did not provide a definite answer. In our view, these data to a certain degree confirm the conclusion that, regardless of the stormy election campaign and the high activeness of a certain portion of the population, many voter categories were passive in relation to what was happening and had kept the traditional mistrust of the possibility for any changes. At the same time, the results show that in the course of the election campaign, the skepticism was somewhat dissipated and the mistrust declined. Thus, after the elections only 8 percent of the respondents stated that they had not noticed any advantages in the current election campaign in comparison with the previous ones. There was a reduced share of those who had absolutely no confidence in the effectiveness of the new electoral law. In December 1988, the skeptics were 34 percent ("the law is scarcely being realized in practice"), while during the period of the election campaign the figure was only 10-14 percent ("the elections will not produce anything and everything remains as before").

After the elections had been held, the opinion of the Muscovites changed substantially. Some 50 percent of those questioned was completely or basically satisfied

with the election results, 34 percent were partially so and 14 percent dissatisfied. What caused the positive view? Above all, the circumstance that the deputies were persons with real authority among the people (41 percent), those whose views were shared by those questions (37 percent) and active supporters of perestroika (29 percent). A predominant majority of those questioned noted the advantage of the current election procedure in comparison with the previous one: there was a real opportunity to select the deputies from several candidates (66 percent), each candidate had an election platform and there was a competition between the programs (47 percent), the people were more interested in the elections (42 percent) and the level of their being informed on the course of the electoral campaign was higher (30 percent). Thus, the poll results show that the Muscovites were aware of the qualitatively higher level of democracy and glasnost which had arisen in the course of the electoral campaign.

#### Unclear Letters of the Law

At the same time, public opinion had rather clearly pointed up the shortcomings of the electoral system and the course of the election campaign. A portion of the respondents kept their (critical) opinion. In first place among the reasons for dissatisfaction was the necessity in a number of instances to conduct a re-election and this, in the opinion of 13 percent of those questioned, creates additional inconveniences. A more mature, in our view, position was voiced by the 13 percent of the respondents who were not satisfied by the fact that their candidate did not become the deputy but rather the one for whom preferential conditions were created. The latter circumstance was pointed out by many (61 percent) of the respondents who as a whole took a positive view of the election campaign and the electoral system. Some 56 percent linked such instances with the unobjective attitude of the local party and soviet bodies to certain candidates. An analysis of the situation and the author's participation in many election measures make it possible to assert that the mistrust of the party and soviet apparatus in organizing and conducting the election campaign was in fact quite strongly felt. However, in our view, the suspicions of the apparatus of various "tricks" in fact to a significant degree were exaggerated (it was a question only of the situation in Moscow). Of course, such attitudes can be understood as the extended use of apparatus methods in political and administrative activities could not help but leave a profound trace in the public mind.

Another weak point in the electoral campaign was the district election meetings. Some 46 percent of those questioned felt that these were not necessary, 34 percent found it difficult to give an answer or did not answer at all while 20 percent supported the idea of the district meetings. Thus, for now in the public mind there is no unanimous position on this question. And although we consider it ill-advised to hold the district meetings (under the condition of an improvement and even a change in the procedure for the proposing and registering



of the candidate deputies), we feel that the recorded fact should be drawn to the attention of the authors of certain publications who have asserted that the public is unanimously against such meetings. Even smaller is the share (19 percent) of those who feel it essential to give up the promoting of candidates from the social organizations (39 percent in favor and 42 percent could not reply definitely). It must be admitted that such a result was also somewhat unexpected for us, since the elections from the social organizations are, in our view, the most vulnerable point of the current electoral system.

Among the other opinions relating to the new electoral system, we should note the desire of 52 percent of those questioned that the candidate live in the district without fail where he is proposed; 26 percent did not agree with this. Some 54 percent were concerned by the circumstance that among the people's deputies there were fewer young people, nonparty persons (42 percent) and workers (36 percent). They judged most calmly the fact that the number of women had declined; some 28 percent related negatively to this and 27 percent positively. In addition, some 53 percent of the respondents had encountered instances of impermissible, incorrect, from their viewpoint, methods of running the election campaign.

#### Lessons of Defeat

There was a very sharp and broad discussion of the question of the nonelection of a number of proposed party workers as people's deputies. The respondents had no clear opinion on the reasons for this. Some 56 percent felt that the given fact was the consequence of the weakening of party authority in society while 14 percent did not agree with this opinion. Around 1/2 of the respondents shared the view that the reason lay in the negative attitude of the public toward the party apparatus. A little more than 1/2 of those questioned also felt that the root of the problem lay in the lack of authority among the specific party workers and in their inability to restructure the style and methods of work. Finally, the last factor in terms of importance was the dissatisfaction of the voters with the pace and course of perestroika. Some 49 percent of those questioned agreed with this explanation and 12 percent did not agree. Probably, each of the factors played a role. In assessing them it is essential to remember that 52 percent of the respondents did not see anything wrong in the facts of the nonelection of individual leading party workers since equally worthy candidates were elected.

A few words about one other category of candidates, the priests. The fact of their election as people's deputies was positively viewed by 71 percent of those questioned and negatively by 3 percent. To the question of whether for the respondent a believing or nonbelieving person was a candidate deputy was important, 78 percent replied in the negative as they considered other criteria as the main ones in choosing a candidate. A rather significant number of voters (30 percent) felt that nationality does play a role in the election and they preferred to see their own nationality elected deputy. For 60 percent, nationality was not important.

An analysis of the opinion of the voters as well as the course of the election campaign makes it possible to draw the following conclusions.

Above all, there is no doubt that the previous elections were a very important real step along the path of reforming the political system and democratizing social life and this has found affirmation and reflection in the minds of the people.

Public awareness also accurately caught and recorded vulnerable points, shortcomings and problems in the new electoral system. Among these are an insufficient level of political culture in election campaigning, the imperfection of the system for proposing and registering candidates, the poor elaboration of many procedural questions and the vulnerability of individual provisions in the Election Law, in particular, on the holding of the district assemblies and the promoting of candidates from the public organizations.

Regardless of the fact that the elections aroused people to energetic political activities, a significant portion of the voters remained rather passive.

Finally, the polls clearly showed the possibilities of sociology for an adequate analysis of the real problems of the current day and its ability to forecast social processes.

#### Footnote

\* The polling of the public in the course of the election campaign was carried out at the place of residence in three territorial electoral districts (N = 1621), and a repeat poll in one of the districts (N = 280). In one electoral district on the eve of the elections there was also a telephone poll (N = 463). For the election results the poll was conducted at enterprises and institutions in two capital rayons (a representative production sample). Some 425 persons were polled in 14 labor and academic collectives. As a total, 2,789 voters were questioned in the course of the elections by the Sector for the Study of the Public Opinion of Muscovites.

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## THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIAL CHANGES

### The Potential of Socialism and the Ideology of Renewal [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 36-41

## DEBATES

### The Nature of Totalitarian Power (Editors' Roundtable Discussion) [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 42-52

## APPLIED RESEARCH

### Experimental Decorations on Old Scaffolding [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 53-59

### Motives for Actions by Juvenile Lawbreakers

905D0006H Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 60-63

[Article by Sergey Ivanovich Kurganov, candidate of legal sciences, junior science associate at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of the USSR MVD. Our journal has published his article "Behind the Barbed Wire—Another Life?" (No 3, 1989)]

[Text] Criminology explains how criminals violate generally accepted standards by way of their own special, asocial system of values which run contrary to the officially approved standards. Correspondingly an analysis of professional crime is based on the theory of asocial subcultures. However, such a concept does not work in terms of juveniles. Why, for example, do juveniles violate a legal prohibition which is considered essential? Why, without denying the very fact of complicity, as a rule, do they not recognize their guilt?

One of the possible answers to this question is to be found in the notion of neutralization of G. Sykes and D. Matza and which has been taken as the theoretical base for our research. According to this concept, it is not an issue that the lawbreakers have a special system of values but rather that they adhere to the conventional standards, using them to justify deviant conduct. A juvenile becomes a lawbreaker, in assimilating the procedures for neutralizing the generally accepted standards and not the moral demands, values or views directly opposed to these standards [2].

From whence did the theory of neutralization derive? Social rules or standards calling for proper conduct in their majority are not expressed in the form of a categorical imperative. A normative system is in no way a rigid compendium of rules the fulfillment of which is obligatory under any circumstances. Such flexibility is also inherent to a criminal law. This is apparent in the standards which remove responsibility on such grounds as being under-age, diminished responsibility, necessary defense, extreme necessity and physical coercion. So the criminal (delinquent) conduct of juveniles to a significant degree is based upon the unconscious broadening of the sphere of action of these mitigating circumstances.

The justification of his crime or its rationalization removes the question of guilt for the lawbreaker. The authors term such justifications as neutralization. It includes five basic procedures: denial of responsibility, denial of harm, denial of the presence of a victim, condemnation of the condemners and the appealing to more important circumstances. The actual method of neutralization is one of the forms of psychological defense and, in particular, a search for reasonable arguments to justify one's own conduct, its necessity, utility and so forth [3].

Our research<sup>1</sup> has shown that moral self-justification in such forms is actually inherent to a significant portion of juvenile lawbreakers. From specific material, let us examine the procedures of neutralization to which the respondents resorted.

**Denial of responsibility.** The juvenile views himself more often as the object of some action, as the victim of circumstances and thereby prepares the grounds for a deviation from the standard which he does not reject. A majority sees the reason for their crime in external circumstances: 59.2 percent of the juveniles mentioned as such an unfortunate coincidence of circumstances, material difficulties and the determining influence of friends. Only 9.5 percent explained what happened by their own personal qualities. One-quarter of those questioned was convinced that any person would have committed a crime in such a situation.

The denial of responsibility in a way breaks the linkage between the principal and his action and eliminates the question of consequences. Some 35.8 percent of the respondents was not thinking about responsibility at the moment of the crime, while 19.6 percent did not suspect at all that such actions might lead them to court. But certainly the social experience of the juvenile would already permit him to be aware of his actions as at least unapproved of. So if he did wonder at all about responsibility, he would assume that it did not yet extend to him.

Such an attitude to a certain degree has been caused by the guidelines of legal education. When they speak about the criminal liability of juveniles, usually they emphasize the humanism of our laws. It is no surprise that among a significant portion of the juveniles, the impression is created that they have relative impunity (probation, the

deferment of a sentence, a reprieve, or measures of social effect are usually viewed by them as release from liability).

Thus, in the control group (law-obeying school children) only 28.8 percent of those questioned knew the age where they could be held criminally liable, and over 1/2 overstated this age. Only 11.9 percent of those questioned correctly gave the maximum punishment which could be applied to juveniles and 52.5 percent were inclined to understate the severity of the law.

**Denial of harm.** For juveniles, the question of the criminality of conduct is closely tied to the notion of harm or loss caused by their actions. This loss can be interpreted in the most different manner. For example, hooliganism is interpreted as mischief-making, stealing a car is seen as temporary borrowing, a fistfight as the elucidation of relations and so forth. Thus, here also generally-accepted standards are not denied but rather there is a sort of broadening of the limits of their action.

Among the convicts questioned only 46.6 percent agreed that their crime caused harm to the victims or to society. Some 25.1 percent felt that they had harmed only themselves or relatives. Some 28.3 percent were convinced that nothing bad had been done to anyone except themselves. Here are some characteristic replies: "I caused harm primarily to myself," considered the person condemned to 7 years imprisonment for rape; "of course I harmed myself and all my plans for a future life have collapsed," wrote a person convicted to 6 years imprisonment for robbery. In such replies one can clearly see a moral and emotional infantilism, the moral callousness of the juveniles and their inability to relate or sympathize with "distant persons" and not only "close ones."

**Denial of the presence of a victim.** Even if the juvenile recognizes his responsibility for incorrect actions and is ready to assume that they caused harm to someone, usually an effort is made to show that his action represented a sort of just retribution or punishment. The lawbreaker places himself in the position of an avenger and the victim is turned into the evil-doer. And although only 3 percent of those questioned stated directly that the committing of the crime by them was a just matter, in actuality many more of the convicts felt this way. The Lyubery and others [rightist, nationalistic gang members], for example, often justified their attacks on punks and hippies by the most noble motives. And the fact that over 1/2 of the convicts did not consider it necessary to be just with unjust persons shows an unconscious broadening of their circle of potential victims.

In this context I would propose that we must be more careful in assessing the criminogenic role of the victim of the crime. (Who of us has not sympathized with Yuri Detochkin in the film "Be Careful of the Car"?) In a number of instances the violent actions of a criminal to some degree actually are provoked by the victim himself. However, the notions of the criminals of this are most often exaggerated, the accents are shifted and, in

assessing the situation, they rely solely on facts which are often distorted and which could be used to reinforce precisely their position.

**Condemnation of the condemners.** A juvenile can shift the center of attention from his own incorrect actions to the position of the persons condemning him. Those persons who are condemning me, he might state, are hypocrites or covert lawbreakers, unjust and bad people. When a lawbreaker attacks others, it is easier for him to overlook or understate the unseemliness of his conduct. Probably the convicts need the guilt of society to them as much as society needs the atonement of the criminals. For this reason, clearly, some 54.6 percent of those questioned felt that the investigatory and court workers could not be termed good people, and they unjustly reviewed all the circumstances of the case, while 55.6 percent of the convicts were certain that a majority of the people does not commit crimes only out of a fear of punishment or because it was simply not a suitable situation.

**Referral to more important circumstances.** External and internal social control can be neutralized also as a result of the fact that the demands of society as a whole are sacrificed to the interests of the small group to which the juvenile belongs. He in no way unconditionally rejects the prevailing normative system but rather views himself as a person confronted with a moral dilemma which, unfortunately, can be resolved only by the breaking of the law.

Clearly, this circumstance was in mind for 1 out of every 4 persons questioned who asserted that the standards of the law can run contrary to moral demands. Generally speaking, it is possible to imagine a legal standard which is in conflict with socialist morality. But the convicts are talking about something else. In their replies they present themselves as some knights of duty and victims of unjust laws: "I could not abandon a comrade," "I did not have the right to be a coward," "The main thing is not to abandon a friend in trouble," and so on in a similar vein. We do not exclude that a portion of the convicts is completely sincere, but this merely confirms the need to develop their correct notions of honor, duty and comradeship. The replies also show that a significant number of prisoners has moral doubts about certain legal standards and they have no respect for the law as one of the important social values. Such a defect of moral awareness cannot be disregarded and it plays an important role in the motivation of the law-breaking conduct of juveniles.

This was rather clearly apparent in the replies to the question: Could the juvenile have committed a theft in order to help a friend out of trouble or at his request? One-third of those questioned replied affirmatively and 38.5 percent hesitated. This same trend was confirmed by the results of the settling of legal cases (conflict) in the research of A.I. Dolgova [4]: in a hypothetical situation of interpersonal relations, the juveniles, in correctly assessing the conduct of other persons (that is, in conformity to the standard) at the same time chose law-breaking variations of their own conduct as more corresponding to their understanding of friendship.

In the already-mentioned concept of Sykes and Matza, the hypothesis is advanced that assertions like "I did not want this," "I caused harm to no one," "They themselves deserved this," or "I did not do this for myself" and frequently used as justification by juveniles, and the very need to justify themselves show that in their illegal conduct, the juveniles do not proceed from any of their own special standards.

Of course, the defense mechanisms, however strong they might be, cannot fully neutralize the effect of the moral values assimilated by a juvenile and the disapproving response to his actions on the part of others. The extensive use of various forms of self-justification points to an inability to make a sober self-assessment and for an objective perception of one's character and conduct. The inadequate assessments of one's personal qualities and moral position cause the negative attitude of the convict to the punishment: 59.2 percent of those questioned do not consider it just, while 62 percent feel that corrective measures were not needed. Such views impede the effective action of reeducation means on the juveniles and encourage the assimilation of the values and standards of the criminal community.

For this reason the carrying out of the tasks involved in reeducating juvenile lawbreakers inevitably encounters a contradiction. On the one hand, a person cannot remain for a long time in the status of a repentant sinner as sooner or later this evokes his protest. The constant reminders of crime impel the juvenile to take the side of others like him as before them there is no need to justify oneself but, on the contrary in this milieu, one can count on understanding and respect. The adopting of the standards of such a milieu by the juvenile alienates him from society's values.

On the other hand, one must also not absolutize the principle of A.S. Makarenko of "do not recall the past." In order for a person who has committed a crime to gain the notion of mending his ways, he must recognize his guilt and atone for what he committed. For this it is essential to surmount his psychological defenses and prove his personal responsibility for the committed crime and the justness of the assigned punishment. If the offender considers the latter unjust, he refuses to recognize the justness in all society and thereby again becomes alienated from it.

The designated contradiction is resolved in the process of concrete individual educational work with the convicts. "The task is to make the punishment an effective consequence of the crime. The punishment should appear in the eyes of the criminal as a necessary result of his own action and consequently be his own action" [1]. The task, of course, is a complicated one. A violation of the law or a crime is always a conflict with the law, with society and with persons around. And in order to achieve an effect in educational and preventive work with the lawbreakers, it is essential to look at the other side of the conflict and understand the logic and motivation in the actions of a juvenile.

#### Footnote

1. The research was conducted in 1986. Some 472 juvenile convicts serving their sentences in corrective labor colonies were questioned. The structure of the sampling aggregate reflected the general in terms of age, education and type of crime. The control group of school children (300 persons) was selected in terms of education. Since the convicts, as a rule, were a grade or two behind their contemporaries in terms of this feature, those examined averaged a year or two older than the respondents in the control group.

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#### Rock Music: Talents and Followers [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 64-69

#### FACTS, COMMENTARIES, NOTES

##### The Labor Collective Council in the System of Managing the Collective [not translated]

00000000 Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 70-73

##### At the Meat Counter

905D0006K Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 74-77

[Article by Alla Konstantinovna Guzanova, junior science associate at the Institute for the Economic Problems of Scientific and Technical Progress Under the USSR Academy of Sciences. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] In the debate on price reform, one of the most acute questions is that of prices for meat and meat products. Their availability is determined not only by cost but also by a number of social factors. What are these? We will endeavor to answer this question in relying on the results of a sampling survey conducted by the Institute for Economic Problems of Scientific and Technical Progress Under the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1987 together with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (leader, Doctor of Economic Sciences A.N. Shokhin). In the course of a written sample, around 700 questionnaires were received from newspaper readers representing over 300 cities and settlements in the nation. Among them were inhabitants of Moscow and Leningrad with 10 percent, Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts with 3 percent, from the capitals of the Union republics with 10 percent, oblast centers with 45 percent, rayon centers with 17 percent, small towns with 6 percent and rural localities with 9 percent. The data were computer-processed using a special program in a dialogue

mode. Although in fact 2 years have passed since the sample, there is every reason to assume that the situation has changed little.

As might be expected, in Moscow, Leningrad and the adjacent oblasts, meat products are basically acquired in state trade or through the order system at enterprises. A similar situation exists in the capitals of the Union republics, although in truth they a certain portion of their residents is now forced to resort to the services of the consumer cooperative stores and the kolkhoz markets. In the oblast and rayon centers, the picture changes with a sharp drop in the opportunity to purchase meat at the state retail prices and there are frequent purchases "under the table" (from the workers of the slaughter houses and from underneath the counter). The situation is somewhat better in the small towns (see Table 1). Clearly, the greatest deficit of meat products at retail prices exists in the oblast and rayon centers, where a significant portion of the nation's urban populus is concentrated.

**Table 1:**  
**Administrative-Territorial Features of Consumer Market, % of Persons Replying\***

Place of Residence of Respondents	Sources of Acquiring Meat Products							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Moscow, Leningrad	84.5	16.9	95.8	2.8	1.4	1.4	—	1.4
Moscow Oblast	95.2	14.3	100	—	—	—	—	—
Union republic capital	71.4	14.3	78.6	17.1	10.0	2.9	1.4	2.9
Oblast center	36.3	11.9	45.0	36.7	34.7	10.0	1.6	1.3
Rayon center	38.3	11.3	46.1	31.3	27.8	7.8	3.5	0.9
Small town	47.2	5.6	52.8	25.0	25.0	2.8	8.34	11.5
Rural locality	25.9	7.4	33.3	31.5	18.5	—	35.3	—
Average for sample	46.9	12.1	55.4	28.1	24.4	6.5	4.7	1.7

\* Respondent could mark several positions.

I—In state trade store; II—In system of on-job orders; III—In state trade or in order system; IV—In consumer cooperative store; V—At kolkhoz market; VI—"Under the table"; VII—Basic source was private plots; VIII—Did not reply.

The relationship of income and the accessibility of meat products at state prices is illustrated by Table 2. The 15 socioprofessional groups have been ranked in order of the diminishing of average per capital income: 1—high (over

150 rubles), 2—above average (131-150 rubles), 3—average (121-130 rubles), 4—below average (111-120 rubles) and 5—low (110 rubles and less).

**Table 2:**  
**Possibilities of Acquiring Meat Products in State Trade Depending Upon Socioprofessional Affiliation of Respondents**

Socioprofessional Groups	Level of Average Per Capita Income		Degree of Accessibility of Meat Products*			
			For Entire Sample		In Oblast Centers	
	For Entire Sample	In Oblast Centers	In Stores	By Order	In Stores	By Order
Leaders, servicemen	1	1	1	1	3	1
VUZ workers	1	1	2	1	5	3
Scientific workers	2	2	2	1	5	3
Workers	2	3	5	5	4	4
Employees of state institutions	3	3	5	5	5	3

**Table 2:**  
**Possibilities of Acquiring Meat Products in State Trade Depending Upon Socioprofessional Affiliation of Respondents**  
**(Continued)**

Socioprofessional Groups	Level of Average Per Capita Income		Degree of Accessibility of Meat Products*			
	For Entire Sample	In Oblast Centers	For Entire Sample		In Oblast Centers	
			In Stores	By Order	In Stores	By Order
Engineer-technical personnel	3	3	3	3	4	4
Physicians	3	3	5	5	2	4
Creative intelligentsia	4	4	3	3	1	1
Pensioners	4	4	2	3	1	1
Junior service personnel	4	5	5	5	5	5
Trade workers	4	5	2	3	1	1
Teachers	4	5	5	5	5	5
Enterprise employees	5	4	1	1	4	2
Cultural workers	5	3	1	1	1	3
Students	5	5	4	5	—	—
Average for Sample	128 rubles	128 rubles	47%	55%	36%	45%

\* Degree of accessibility is an indicator characterizing the share of meat purchasers at the state price which is calculated depending upon place of residence in relation to all the persons questioned or an isolated aggregate of inhabitants in the oblast centers. This indicator was calculated proceeding from the average percentages in the sample. For persons using predominantly stores (these were 47% in the sample), the scale of accessibility has the following appearance: 1) very high) with 53% and more, 2 (high) with 48-52%, 3 (average) with 43-47%, 4 (low) with 38-42% and 5 (very low) with not more than 38%. The scales were calculated in an analogous manner for the other sources of acquiring meat products. In all instances, the scale divisioning is 5%.

In the oblast centers, the share of persons purchasing meat at the state price was 10 percent lower than the sample average. However, here we did not observe any essential changes in income structure. Clearly it was a matter of certain other factors. For example, workers have very limited opportunities with high incomes and on the contrary the trade and service workers and the creative intelligentsia have broad opportunities with low income.

In the supply of the public with food products, a major role is played by the system of placing orders at enterprises and institutions as well as purchasing food products "under the table." The first method represents the administrative distribution of scarce items and is characterized by a departmental focus. The second channel operates spontaneously. Currently the importance of the order system is growing. Here the highly-paid social groups (in addition to the workers) and the lowly-paid categories who have access to the trade channels are drawing closer together.

An analysis indicates that the social differentiation is also being reduced by the action of such a factor as purchases "under the table" (here high-quality products destined for state trade are being sold). The representatives of those social groups which do not have an opportunity to use the order system at the place of employment resort primarily to this source. Here are included a majority of the physicians and trade workers, a significant portion of the teachers and junior service personnel. In a word, basically the low- and medium-paid strata make "under the table" purchases.

The equalizing over the long run in the wages of the leading sectors of the nonproduction sphere and in material production is one of the fundamental questions of economic policy [2]. The results obtained by us indirectly show the recognition in public opinion of the social importance of the professions of physicians and teachers. It can be said that the representatives of these professions are thereby compensated for their low earnings.

The sale of high-quality meat products through state trade has been accompanied by a definite redistribution of the existing subsidies. How does this come about? In the first place, due to the mass transporting out of the capital cities of the products to be sold there. Secondly, due to the insufficient price differentiation depending upon quality. It is to the point here to give the opinion of the respondents on the change in the quality of meat products over the last 10-15 years. A predominant majority (85 percent) feels that this has deteriorated sharply. In Moscow and Leningrad, virtually everyone (97 percent) adheres to this opinion and the point is that the good products are hauled out of these cities. Thirdly, an important role is played by the privileged supply of the influential ministries and departments, where the high-quality products are distributed through various distributors, including the order system. But as a rule only medium-quality products reach the regular organizations and the public. Finally, the scarcity of high-quality products is exacerbated by the resale "from under the table."

If one excludes from the review the zones of privileged supply, then the following groups have the greatest opportunities to acquire scarce products: 1. Leaders and white collar personnel from a number of enterprises and departments and scientific workers. The wages are high and average. 2. A small portion of lowly-paid workers who have direct access to scarce goods. 3. Skilled specialists employed in medicine, education as well as creative workers. 4. Pensioners who have special benefits.

In the most difficult situation are the industrial workers who are a highly-paid category as well as low-skill workers in the nonproduction sphere. At their expense there has been a redistribution of income in the process of its realization, in particular in subsidies for food products.

For a significant portion of the population, the sole means to resolve urgent domestic problems is the replacing of commodity-monetary relations with various types of in-kind exchanges and transactions. The existing distribution mechanism forces people to enter into such relations. The public considers unjust the existence of distributors with their narrow departmental approach and above all the privileges of the administrative personnel. However, due to the leveling trends which are deep rooted in public conscience as well as due to the factor of the universal shortage, the "distributor for all" is supported by the public. The economic consequences of such a policy include the depletion of the market, scarcity and the driving up of prices. As a result, regardless of the real increase in the output of foodstuffs over the last 3 years, the nation has suffered an acute shortage in them [3].

**Table 3:**  
**Distribution of Replies to Question of Introducing Meat Rationing, %**

Place of Residence of Respondents	"In Favor"	Generally "In Favor" But There Will Be Negative Consequences	"Against"	Difficult to Reply
Moscow, Leningrad	5.6	26.8	56.3	11.3
Moscow Oblast	9.5	23.8	57.2	9.5
Union republic capital	10.0	25.7	55.7	8.6
Oblast center	26.0	38.3	28.3	7.4
Rayon center	26.1	34.8	33.9	5.2
Small town	25.0	36.1	33.3	5.6
Urban locality	22.2	27.8	37.0	13.0

The nation has no confidence in a rapid improvement in the consumer market and is in favor of a state-regulated normed [rationed] distribution of goods as a means of guaranteed supply and combating speculation. As an illustration, let us give the results of a public opinion poll on the introduction of meat rationing (Table 3). Over 1/2 of the capital's inhabitants was against such a decision. But a majority of the inhabitants in the oblast and rayon centers, the small towns and rural localities supported the introduction of meat rationing. The respondents were fully aware that this measure was not a panacea against all problems. However, they preferred rationing than increase prices. A majority of the inhabitants questioned in various regions (around 80 percent in the cities and 65 percent in the rural localities) was against increasing the prices for meat products and do not consider this an effective means for combating the shortages.

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#### Newcomers From Stagnation

905D0006L Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 89 (signed  
to press 25 Oct 89) pp 77-79

[Article by Arkadiy Mikhaylovich Presman, a journalist.  
Our journal has published him in the letters section]

[Text] For a rather long time, I have happened to be unofficially involved in rehabilitating persons addicted to drugs together with a group of practicing researchers and have encountered the problem, as they say, "from within." Without claiming the infallibility of my conclusions, I would like to voice certain considerations concerning the development of drug addiction in the nation.

First of all, on the primary causes for the occurrence of this phenomenon. It seems to me that both in our country as well as in the developed capitalist countries, it is stagnation which has pushed the young people into drugs. The only difference is that in the West it can be termed the "stagnation of prosperity," when material

living conditions have improved with stagnation processes being observed in the social and spiritual spheres while in our country the stagnation has touched all aspects of life. The chronological points of the reckoning are approximately the same: for "them" at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s and for "us" the most noticeable growth making it possible to speak about drug addiction as a social phenomenon occurred in 1968 which marked the final retreat of the "thaw" (incidentally, the crime rate also turned sharply upwards then [1]).

Now about the differences. While in the West the sale of drugs has been very quickly turned into a well-organized and wide-scale business, drug dealing drew the youth into its networks, in stimulating demand in every possible way and creating a "fashion," under our conditions drug dealing could not develop as unhindered (in time, it still developed and grew stronger). In a word, initially "amateur activities" were the main source for the movement of drugs. Control was relatively weak. However, in my view, there is no need to exaggerate the fact that in those years it was possible almost freely to purchase certain narcotics-containing medicines in a drugstore. In any event, this did not give rise to addiction. Moreover, I would be so bold as to assert (although I recognize the seditiousness of my idea) that the withdrawal of a number of compounds from free sale, the introduction of strict reporting and other prohibiting measures which were not reinforced by extensive preventive work not only did not stop the development of addiction but also helped to strengthen drug dealing. The restrictions justified a rise in prices and a person who was dependent upon a drug was ready to resort to crime in order to get a fix. The attitude toward the addicts as criminals and not sick persons forced them to resort to a careful conspiracy; the compulsory confinement to a hospital helped to "exchange experience." Here isolation from the outside sources of access to drugs was not only not guaranteed but often they were securable here. Very quickly the addicts learned to adapt to the circumstances and even derive benefit from them. Thus arose the method of "rejuvenation" or "bucking up," the essence of which was that the addict voluntarily "turned himself in" for treatment and after detoxification it again took a small dose, sometimes, 10-12-fold less than before and, correspondingly, this was significantly cheaper. Nor did drugs die out in places of incarceration and these became a real "school" in addiction. A system of effective treatment was virtually absent. In 1974, several specialized in-patient clinics were opened but 2 or 3 years later they were closed down. In a word, the first steps to combat addiction were a typical campaign with the initially excessively harsh measures for the victorious reports and then nothing. The ideological grounds for the impossibility of drug addiction in a socialist society did not help our success. As a result, the problem was viewed not as a serious social phenomenon but rather as some craze or fashion imported from the West which was transitory and accidental. At the same time, the number of addicts grew, the range of drugs used broadened and permanent marketing networks arose which developed almost unhindered until 1986.

We completely ignored foreign experience while in the West research on drug addiction had been carried out for

a long time and treatment and rehabilitation measures had been developed, not to mention a range of purely law enforcement measures. Here many causal factors such as frustration, dissatisfaction and the nerve-rattling situation in large cities exist both in the West as well as in our nation and moreover this can also be said of the physiological prerequisites. And as for such an accomplice of drug addiction as the drug culture, that is, certain traditions and rites which regulate the consumption of narcotics and the related philosophical and mystical notions, here there were few differences between our nation and the West. I will not take up in detail the situation in the Western countries and particularly in the United States, but will merely say that the economic basis of drug addiction was completely incorporated there in the mafioso "shadow system." Ultimately, the main users were the dwellers of the "abyss," the marginal groups and the rebelling youth. A general interest in the East initially caused a rather mass involvement in Eastern drug culture but subsequently, with the change in fashion, this remained only among individual strata of society.

In our nation certain drugs have long been consumed in Central Asia and were also used in criminal circles. In both instances, it was merely a question of an agent—like alcohol—without any ideological underpinnings. But when the boundaries of consumption were substantially broadened, a new situation arose. The necessity of the processing involved in obtaining drugs, the absence of easily available sources and criminal prosecution contributed to the predominant development of a "low-life" drug culture involved largely with actions and rituals and with a specific community (the "elite" drug culture based on philosophical and mystical notions arose as a consequence of the use of drugs; it is little found in our nation). Stagnation in all spheres of social life impelled the search for psychological compensation and this created the prerequisites for the ever-broader spread of drug addiction. While at the beginning of the 1970s, one could rarely encounter a drug addict younger than 16-17 years of age, in the 1980s, drugs began to be found among 10-12-year-olds and even children could be encountered among the addicts. A qualitatively new situation had arisen: in the search not even for euphoria but merely unusual sensations which life offered more and more rarely the juveniles carried out all sorts of experiments. If one considers such particular features of age as the thirst for exploration and creativity, heightened sensitivity and the desire to increase one's status in the group plus the rapid formation of a psychological and physical dependence, it is not surprising that quite young kids at times achieved results which were almost beyond a scientific laboratory. Complicated instruments were not required and it was possible to get by with organoleptic methods including color, taste, odor and temperature. In following information from textbooks and generally available manuals, they were able to select among harmless medicines and chemicals the raw materials for nonclassic methods of synthesis. Probably such a thing would not even come into the head of a professional chemist.

The psychology of narcotic abusers and particularly the group psychology is also an essential and almost



unstudied question. Their lives in no way can be reduced to frenzied search for drugs and their use, although this was a core, unifying factor. But only so not independently but as an identifier of one's microgroup and the basis of contact.

Moreover, the value of drugs is not exhausted by its monetary value or psychological action. Also important are all the accompanying experiences, including a situational assessment, that is, that which is achieved at a risk is correspondingly more highly valued. In the Western nations, almost everywhere there are "pushers" or distributors; the obtaining of a drug is reduced to a by-and-sell act. According to our "customs," the completeness of sensations rises substantially when one feels oneself in the "trade." Such an attitude is rather widespread and although it is manifested differently, behind it always stands the same thing: the consumption of a drug is not an isolated event (I secured and I used). This is organically and diversely linked through all the accompanying actions, rituals and attributes of the drug culture with daily living realities. It is not surprising that the drug culture has developed into a rather complex system and, as a rule, does not need to borrow from the Eastern "classics." The rituals are not pro forma, they should be taken seriously and their effect not underestimated. Here the sensation of complicity and the effect of the group are very strong.

Several words about measures needed for a fundamental improvement in the situation. The problem is that there is a certain limit or "resolving power" for any measures of control and stopping the shadowy systems. If the average size of the elementary cell in the "shadowy system" and its activeness do not exceed a certain level, then the cell is virtually beyond the reach for mass campaigns. In other words, with the maintaining of the prerequisite for a reproduction of the phenomenon, any actions cause merely a relaxation or a transitional process with resumption. Even if the primary causes disappear, the attenuation, "absorption" of the existing "shadowy system" will take a significant time. Here a direct power action is incapable of eliminating it completely. (A similar mechanism is well known in ecology as even a multiple, in comparison with the standard, increase in the concentration and scale of employing a toxin does not lead to the complete eradication of insect pests.)

The forecast is harsh, although it is based upon a real situation which can be said without exaggeration to be a crisis one. Judge for yourselves. As a consequence of the attitude long fostered by official propaganda toward drug

addiction as something organically alien and hostile (a "Western illness"), and almost mystically terrible and dangerous, the response of public opinion is marked by incompetence and harshness. "The drug addict is not a sick person but a criminal" and this is the initial thesis with all the ensuing consequences. The situation is exacerbated by the habit of "storming an issue" and the gross result and the "fulfilling of the plan" at any price with a scarcity of an awareness of the law and a lack of sophistication in means, particularly in the inferior law and order bodies. One of the most vulnerable places is the extremely poor development of a network of special medical facilities, including psychiatric clinics; the lack of anonymous treatment and volunteer aid societies. Finally, the criminal legislation has lumped the users and "heads," the producers and sellers into a single group. No distinction has been drawn between the former and the latter and between all of them and society. As a result, there has been a growing consolidation; the conspiracy has become more refined; the search has intensified for methods to make drugs and so forth. In brief, regardless of the deepening measures of a repressive sort, there is no effective control over drug addiction.

I am convinced of the need for a different approach which has been adopted in virtually all the developed countries. Above all, this is the abandoning of the prosecution of users and a broad system of social rehabilitation based chiefly on a network of voluntary societies. In the USSR there already are numerous unofficial aid groups and it must be admitted that they operate rather effectively. Certainly, official medicine is also essential but for now its attitude is far from humane. If the situation were to change here, if a network of mutual aid clubs employing volunteers would be set up everywhere and not reduced to individual "model facilities," then in 3-5 years it would be possible to achieve effective control over the drug problem and then reduce its scale. One last thing: we must not expect rapid results and years are needed. But a start must be made now before a "readjustment" of drug addiction has occurred and new "discoveries" made. The lost time means the death of people.

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